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Abstract. Homomorphic universally composable (UC) commitments allow for the sender to reveal the
result of additions and multiplications of values contained in commitments without revealing the values
themselves while assuring the receiver of the correctness of such computation on committed values. In
this work, we construct essentially optimal additively homomorphic UC commitments from any (not
necessarily UC or homomorphic) extractable commitment. We obtain amortized linear computational
complexity in the length of the input messages and rate 1. Next, we show how to extend our scheme
to also obtain multiplicative homomorphism at the cost of asymptotic optimality but retaining low
concrete complexity for practical parameters. While the previously best constructions use UC oblivious
transfer as the main building block, our constructions only require extractable commitments and PRGs,
achieving better concrete efficiency and offering new insights into the sufficient conditions for obtaining
homomorphic UC commitments. Moreover, our techniques yield public coin protocols, which are com-
patible with the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. These results come at the cost of realizing a restricted version
of the homomorphic commitment functionality where the sender is allowed to perform any number of
commitments and operations on committed messages but is only allowed to perform a single batch
opening of a number of commitments. Although this functionality seems restrictive, we show that it can
be used as a building block for more efficient instantiations of recent protocols for secure multiparty
computation and zero knowledge non-interactive arguments of knowledge.
1 Introduction
A commitment scheme is the digital equivalent of a locked box containing a committed message chosen by a
prover. Once the prover gives away the box to a verifier, the content cannot be changed, the commitment is
binding. On the other hand, the verifier cannot look into the box so the message is hidden until the prover gives
away the key to the box. Commitments are perhaps the most fundamental building block in cryptographic
protocols and despite the conceptual simplicity of the primitive, it has far-reaching consequences and many
applications, e.g., to coin-flipping, zero-knowledge proofs and many other things.
The simplest form of commitment that only have the basic binding and hiding properties follow from one-
way functions. On the other hand, one may wish for many other properties, such as non-malleability, security
under composition etc. The strongest form of commitments, namely UC secure commitments, has all these
properties, but on the other hand can only be implemented under setup assumptions, such as the common
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reference string model. In this model, UC commitments imply secure key exchange, so since some sort of
public-key technology seems to be required, it was believed for a long time that even if UC commitments
are the gold standard for security, they must be much less efficient than the weaker type that only requires
symmetric primitives.
However, in [18] and independently in [24,9], this was shown to be false: one can push the use of public-
key technology into a preprocessing phase that is only needed once and for all and the cost of which does
not depend on the number of commitments to be done later. Notably, the actual commitment and opening
protocols only requires simple finite field algebra and a pseudorandom generator. After this, a long line of
research optimized this approach [17,22], culminating in [16] where it was shown that after doing O(k + s)
string OTs in the setup phase (where s is the statistical security parameter and k is the message length)
one can commit at rate approaching 1, that is, the communication required is k + o(1) bits, furthermore
the computational complexity is linear in k7. Finally, the commitments are additively homomorphic, i.e.,
one commits to vectors over a finite field F, and if a, b ∈ Fk have been committed, prover and verifier can
compute a commitment to a+ b which, if opened, would reveal only the sum.
The first construction from this line of work [18] had also a multiplicatively homomorphic property, namely
the prover can send the verifier a single message, and this allows the verifier to compute a commitment to
a ∗ b, the coordinate-wise (Schur) product of the vectors. However, subsequent constructions did not have
this property.
So, while this line of research has resulted in constructions that are optimal in several respects, it still
leaves some important and natural questions unanswered:
Is it overkill to use OT in the setup phase? All efficient earlier schemes [18,24,17,22,16] use OT in the
preprocessing phase, but this is in general a stronger primitive than commitment. Even UC commitments
do not always imply OT, this depends on the setup assumption. It is therefore natural to ask if we can
make do with only commitment in the preprocessing, thus obtaining a proper “commitment extension”
result.
Can we make an efficient multi-verifier scheme? The commitments from [16], and in fact all construc-
tions from this line of work, can only work with one verifier because security against a corrupt prover
depends on the verifier’s private choice of selections bits in the initial OT’s. Thus, if a prover needs to
commit towards several verifiers, the only known solution is to run many instances of the scheme, one for
each verifier and then on top of this have the prover convince the verifiers that (s)he committed to the
same message. This seems quite far from an ideal solution.
Can we also get multiplicatively homomorphic schemes? The most efficient constructions are not
multiplicative, but one earlier scheme was in fact “fully homomorphic” [18]. So it is natural to ask if
we can solve the above problems and also get multiplication at the same time.
1.1 Our contributions
In this paper, we come up with positive answers to all of the above questions. We present a protocol for UC
secure commitments that has the well known structure consisting of a preprocessing phase and a phase where
the actual commitments are built, computed on and opened. In addition to achieving the same asymptotic
efficiency as the former best scheme [16] in the single-verifier additive case, our protocol supports multiple
verifiers and multiplicative homomorphism.
In contrast to previous work, however, the preprocessing only makes use of a commitment scheme (and
not OT)8. Notably, however, this commitment scheme does not need to be homomorphic, and in fact it does
7All this holds in an amortized sense, assuming we make enough commitments so that the cost of the setup phase
is dwarfed.
8The scheme of [9] can be constructed from an extractable commitment and an equivocal commitment. However,
it is intrinsically incompatible with homomorphic operations.
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not even need to be UC secure. It just needs to be extractable and hiding - here, extractable means that
the simulator can extract the committed value from a corrupt prover. For UC full security one usually needs
also equivocation (when the prover is honest, the simulator can fake a commitment and later open it to any
value). The commitment scheme we build uses only a PRG and finite field arithmetic after the preprocessing.
It has rate 1, it is additively homomorphic, and linear time. Security does not depend on any secret choices
of the verifier, so the scheme easily extends to multiple verifiers with no essential loss of security. Finally, we
show how to make the scheme multiplicative, the scheme is then only quasilinear, and we get constant rate
instead of rate 1.
All these results come at the cost that what we implement is a slightly weaker commitment functionality
than the standard one. Namely, it allows opening of committed values only in a final stage and after this the
functionality stops working. Equivalently, one can think of this as a functionality one can use exactly as the
standard one, except that when opening a value the prover simply tells the verifier what the committed value
is. Of course a corrupt prover can lie, but there is a final verification stage where the prover will be caught
if he lied.
We show that despite this limitation there are a wide range of applications for the scheme. While we
describe these in more detail below, it is already intuitively clear that our functionality is sufficient for ZK
proofs, for instance: the verifier needs to decide to accept or reject only at the end of the protocol so it is
sufficient that a cheating prover is caught at that point. As a simple example of the power of our construction,
consider that UC secure commitments are easy to implement in the (global) random oracle model [11]: one
simply inputs the message concatenated with some randomness to the oracle and uses the output as the
commitment. Of course, a random oracle based scheme has no homomorphic properties: a random oracle “by
definition” has no such structure. But nevertheless, we can use it as commitment scheme in our preprocessing
and get a homomorphic scheme. In general, one can think of our protocol as a “commitment extension” result.
It is similar to the well known OT extension protocols, but incomparable because we get extra homomorphic
properties (and perhaps UC security) for free, but we realize a slightly weaker functionality.
Techniques. On the technical side, our approach is best described by referring to previous work such as [16]:
the main idea there was that the prover commits to a vector a by encoding it using a linear code C. He then
additively secret shares each coordinate in the codeword C(a) to get two shares for each position. Using the
OT’s from the preprocessing, the verifier will learn one out of the two shares for each position, however, the
prover does not know which shares the verifier has. To open, the prover must reveal C(a) and all shares, and
the verifier can now check that the prover sent a codeword and that the shares are consistent with C(a) and
with the shares the verifier knows.
Intuitively, since the verifier has only one share of each coordinate, C(a) is unknown to him at commit
time. On the other hand, if the prover wants to open a different value, he must change to a different codeword.
However, if C has large minimum distance, this means the prover must change many coordinates and therefore
must lie about many of the shares. Since he does not know which shares he can change without being detected,
this can only be done with negligible success probability9.
In order to avoid having to do an OT for each codeword position and each commitment, instead the
prover chooses seeds si,j for a PRG, where i points to a codeword position and j = 0, 1. The shares for all
the commitments are then constructed by running the PRG on all these seeds and for each i an OT is done
that transfers either si,0 or si,1 to the verifier.
Our key observation now is that it is actually sufficient if the prover simply commits to the seeds in the
preprocessing phase, if we are careful later. Namely, we run the same protocol as we would have done had
the OTs been used, but at the end of the protocol, the verifier will ask the prover to reveal either si,0 or si,1
for each i. Note that, as long as a corrupt prover cannot predict which seeds he will be asked for, he is in
9This argument works, even if the prover did not choose a codeword at commit time. If we also want to have
additive homomorphism, we need to check that the prover chose something that it at least close to a codeword. This
can be done using, e.g., the interactive proximity testing from [16].
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the exactly same position as in the original protocol. The verifier will receive the same information as before,
but cannot verify it until the end, so hence openings can only be done, or at least can only be verified, at
the end. A corrupt verifier clearly has no advantage compared to the OT based protocol: he learns the same
information, only later.
A very nice “side effect” of this is that we can now easily have several verifiers. They just need to receive
the prover’s initial commitments (assuming, of course that the initial commitments support this). Then at
the end, they can decide, e.g., by coin flipping which seeds to ask for.
We also extend the commitment scheme to allow for proving multiplicative relations on committed values.
For this purpose, we require the code C to have the property that its square C∗2 is also a good code,
with large minimum distance. Here C∗2 is defined to be the span of all pairwise Schur-products of words
from C. Moreover, we replace the 2-party additive secret sharing by 3-party linear secret sharing which is
multiplicative: the Schur-product of sets of shares of u, v ∈ F is (essentially) an additive secret sharing of uv.
The effect of all this is that if we multiply two commitments to a, b by multiplying corresponding components
of them, we obtain a commitment to a ∗ b of essentially the same form as in the original protocol, except
that underlying code is now C∗2. See more details within. The new demands we place on C imply that we
can only get constant rate and not rate 1 and also that complexity will be quasilinear rather than linear. The
main motivation for this construction is that we get the multiplicative property and at the same time have
multiple verifiers and use only commitment for preprocessing. An earlier scheme that achieves multiplicative
homomorphism was constructed in [18] via building first an elaborate VSS (verifiable secret sharing) scheme.
Our construction obtains similar asymptotic complexity, but it requires less conditions on the underlying
linear code. Indeed, our multiplicatively homomorphic scheme can be constructed from any linear code whose
minimum distance and squares minimum distance are large enough. In contrast, [18] requires in addition a
code whose duals minimum distance is large enough (i.e., equivalent to multiplicative secret sharing scheme).
Thanks to this, for fixed security parameters we can give an explicit bound for the rate of our multiplicative
commitment based on recent results on squares of cyclic codes (details in Section 4.1).
1.2 Applications
Efficient Zero-Knowledge Arguments. A recent line of research is concerned with the construction of prac-
tically efficient succinct non-interactive zero-knownledge arguments of knowledge (e.g. [1,10,32]) with a par-
ticular focus on optimizing the efficiency of the prover while keeping verification complexity sub-linear.
One such approach, originally dating back to [5], compiles a public coins interactive proof system for a
language L into a zero-knowledge proof system for the same language. This transformation is conceptually
simple: Instead of sending its messages to the verifier in the clear, the prover provides only commitments of
his messages to the verifier. At the end of the protocol, the prover provides a zero-knowledge proof to the
verifier which asserts that the verifier of the original proof system would accept the committed transcript.
This transformation has received renewed interest in the light of efficient P-delegation schemes [25,30].
Wahby et al. [32] observed that this approach can be implemented in a particularly efficient way if the
verifier of the interactive proof system is algebraic: In this case the zero-knowledge proof in the transformation
of [5] can be implemented very efficiently via homomorphic commitments.
We show that using our homomorphic commitment scheme, this transformation can be performed at a
very low overhead, i.e. we can convert any public coin interactive proof system with algebraic verifier into an
honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof system such that the communication complexity of the protocol grows
only by a small factor and both prover and verifier incur only a small constant factor overhead. Using the Fiat
Shamir transform [20], we can convert such a proof system into a succinct non-interactive zero-knowledge
argument.
Committed MPC. The so called “Committed MPC” protocol [21] requires a multiparty additively homomor-
phic commitment protocol that supports additions of commitments generated by different senders. While a
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generic approach for constructing such schemes from any two-party additively homomoprhic commitments
was proposed in [21], their generic construction for t parties requires t2 calls to the underlying commitment
scheme. If instantiated with the previously best two-party additively homomorphic commitment protocol
of [16] using a [n, k, s] code, this construction would require nt2 OTs plus extra communication in the order
of O(nmt2) to commit to m messages of length k. We provide a new generic construction from multi-receiver
additively homomorphic commitments which can be instantiated with our new protocols, requiring only nt
non-homomorphic commitments (e.g. random oracle commitments) plus extra communication in the order
of O(smt) to achieve the same.
Insured MPC. The topic of MPC with financial penalties has attracted increasing attention recently [2,6,27,7,4].
The main idea is to combine MPC techniques with cryptocurrencies in order to provide monetary incentives
for the participants to act honestly during the protocol execution. Insured MPC [4], the most efficient solu-
tion to date, uses a publicly verifiable additively homomorphic multi-receiver commitment as an important
component to build the protocol. However, the employed commitment scheme is a bottleneck in that con-
struction as its complexity grows quadratically in the number of participants. Using our new techniques
together with an authenticated bulletin board (which is also used in the previous construction), it is pos-
sible to dramatically improve the performance of publicly verifiable additively homomorphic multi-receiver
commitment. We can obtain extremely efficient instantiations, for instance, by using the canonical random
oracle commitment scheme. The improvement in computational and communication complexity achieved for
this application is very similar to that of the Committed MPC case, since the previously best protocol for
publicly verifiable additively homomorphic multi-receiver commitments [4] has a very similar structure to the
multi-sender protocol of [21]. Thus, we basically go from quadratic to linear in the number of players.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we establish notation and introduce notions that will be used throughout the paper. We borrow
much of the notation from [16].
2.1 Notation
The set of the n first positive integers is denoted [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Given a finite set D, sampling a uniformly
random element from D is denoted r
$←D. Vectors of elements of some field are denoted by bold lower-case
letters, while matrices are denoted by bold upper-case letters. We denote finite fields by F and write Fq for
the finite field of size q. For z ∈ Fk, z[i] denotes the i’th entry of the vector, where z[1] is the first element
of z. The coordinate-wise (Schur) product of two vectors is denoted by ∗, i.e. if a, b ∈ Fn, then a ∗ b ∈ Fn
and (a ∗ b)[i] = a[i]b[i]. If A ⊆ [n], we will use piA to denote the projection that outputs the coordinates
with index in A of a vector. For a matrix M ∈ Fn×k, we let M[·, j] denote the j’th column of M and M[i, ·]
denote the i’th row. The row support of M is the set of indices I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that M[i, ·] 6= 0.
We say that a function  is negligible in n if for every positive polynomial p there exists a constant c
such that (n) < 1p(n) when n > c. Two ensembles X = {Xκ,z}κ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ and Y = {Yκ,z}κ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ of
binary random variables are said to be statistically indistinguishable, denoted by X ≈s Y , if for all z it holds
that | Pr[D(Xκ,z) = 1]− Pr[D(Yκ,z) = 1] | is negligible in κ for every probabilistic algorithm (distinguisher)
D. In case this only holds for computationally bounded (non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT))
distinguishers we say that X and Y are computationally indistinguishable and denote it by ≈c.
2.2 Coding Theory
For a vector x ∈ Fn, we denote the Hamming-weight of x by ‖x‖0 = |{i ∈ [n] : x[i] 6= 0}|. Let C ⊂ Fn be a
linear subspace of Fn. We say that C is an F-linear [n, k, d] code, if C has dimension k and it holds for every
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nonzero x ∈ C that ‖x‖0 ≥ d, i.e., the minimum distance of C, denoted dist(C), is at least d. The distance
dist(C,x) between C and a vector x ∈ Fn is the minimum of ‖c− x‖0 when c ∈ C. The rate of an F-linear
[n, k, d] code is kn and its relative minimum distance is
d
n .
A matrix G ∈ Fn×k is a generator matrix of C if C = {Gx : x ∈ Fk}, and we write C(x) = Gx. The code
C is systematic if it has a generator matrix G such that the submatrix given by the top k rows of G is the
identity matrix I ∈ Fk×k.
For an F-linear [n, k, d] code C, we denote by Cm the m-interleaved product of C, which is defined by
Cm = {C ∈ Fn×m : ∀i ∈ [m] : C[·, i] ∈ C}. In other words, Cm consists of all Fn×m matrices for which
all columns are in C. We can think of Cm as a linear code with symbol alphabet Fm, where we obtain
codewords by taking m arbitrary codewords of C and bundling together the components of these codewords
into symbols from Fm. For a matrix E ∈ Fn×m, ‖E‖0 is the number of nonzero rows of E, and the code Cm
has minimum distance at least d′ if all nonzero C ∈ Cm satisfy ‖C‖0 ≥ d′. With this definition, it is easy
to see that dist(Cm) = dist(C)
For an F-linear [n, k, d] code C, we denote by C∗2 the Schur square of C, which is defined as the linear
subspace of Fn generated by all the possible vectors of the form v ∗w with v,w ∈ C. This is an [n, kˆ, dˆ] code
where kˆ ≥ k and dˆ ≤ d.
2.3 Interactive Proximity Testing and Linear Time Building Blocks
We will use the interactive proximity testing technique and corresponding linear time building blocks in-
troduced in [16]. As stated in [16], this technique consists in the following argument: suppose we sample a
function H from an almost universal family of linear hash functions (from Fm to F`), and we apply this to
each of the rows of a matrix X ∈ Fn×m, obtaining another matrix X′ ∈ Fn×`; because of linearity, if X
belonged to an interleaved code Cm, then X′ belongs to the interleaved code C`. Theorem 1 states that
we can test whether X is close to Cm by testing instead if X′ is close to C` (with high probability over
the choice of the hash function) and moreover, if these elements are close to the respective codes, the set of
rows that have to be modified in each of the matrices in order to correct them to codewords are the same.
Definition 1 (Almost Universal Linear Hashing [16]). We say that a family H of linear functions




[H(x) = 0] ≤ ,
where H is chosen uniformly at random from the family H. We say that H is universal, if it is |F−s|-almost
universal. We will identify functions H ∈ H with their transformation matrix and write H(x) = H · x.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 in [16]). Let H : Fm → F2s+t be a family of |F|−2s-almost universal F-linear hash
functions. Further let C be an F-linear [n, k, s] code. Then for every X ∈ Fn×m at least one of the following
statements holds, except with probability |F|−s over the choice of H $←H:
1. XH> has distance at least s from C(2s+t)
2. For every C′ ∈ C(2s+t) there exists a C ∈ Cm such that XH> − C′ and X − C have the same row
support
Remark 1 ([16]). If the first item in the statement of the Theorem does not hold, the second one must hold.
Then we can efficiently recover a codeword C with distance at most s − 1 from X using erasure correction,
given a codeword C′ ∈ C(2s+t) with distance at most s−1 from XH>. More specifically, we compute the row
support of XH> −C′, erase the corresponding rows of X and recover C from X using erasure correction10.
The last step is possible as the distance between X and C is at most s− 1.
10Recall that erasure correction for linear codes can be performed efficiently via gaussian elimination.
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In order to achieve linear time and optimal rate (i.e., rate-1) in our constructions, we will need to instan-
tiate interactive proximity testing with a family of linear time almost universal linear hash functions and a
linear time encodable error correcting code that achieves rate 1. Theorems 3 and 6 from [16] guarantee that
explicit constructions of such building blocks exist.
The following theorem is a strengthening of Theorem 3 of [16] in that the output of the hash functions is
guaranteed to be uniformly random given that its first l inputs are uniformly random. The full proof is given
in Supplementary Material Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Fix a finite field F of constant size, let s ∈ N be a statistical security parameter, let n ∈ N and
let l = s + O(log(n)). Then there exists an explicit family H : Fl+n → Fl of |F|−s-universal hash functions
that can be represented by O(s2) bits and computed in time O(n). Moreover, it holds for any function H ∈ H
that if x = (x1, . . . , xl, . . . xl+n) is such that the x1, . . . , xl are independently uniform and xl+1, . . . , xl+n are
independent of x1, . . . , xl, then H(x) is distributed uniformly random.
2.4 Universal Composability
The protocols presented in this paper are proven secure in the Universal Composability (UC) framework
introduced by Canetti in [12]. We refer the reader to the Supplementary Material Appendix A and [12] for
further details.
Adversarial Model: Our protocols will be proven secure against static and active adversaries. In other
words, the adversary may deviate from the protocol in any arbitrary way and can only corrupt parties before
the protocol execution starts.
Functionality FCOM
FCOM is parameterized by commitment length λ. FCOM interacts with a sender P , a set of receivers V =
{V1, . . . , Vt} and an adversary S and proceeds as follows:
– Commit Phase: Upon receiving a message (commit, sid, ssid, P, V,m) from P where m ∈ {0, 1}λ , record
the tuple (ssid, P, V,m) and send (receipt, sid, ssid, P, V ) to every receiver Vi ∈ V and S. Ignore subsequent
commit messages with the same ssid.
– Open Phase: Upon receiving a message (reveal, sid, ssid) from P , if a tuple (ssid, P, V,m) was previously
recorded, then send (reveal, sid, ssid, P, V,m) to every receiver Vi ∈ V and S. Otherwise, ignore.
Fig. 1. Functionality FCOM.
Setup Assumption: Since UC commitment protocols cannot be obtained in the plain model [13], they need
a setup assumption, i.e., a resource available to all parties before the protocol starts. In this work, our goal is to
prove security in the FCOM-hybrid model [12,14], where the parties have access to an ideal (non-homomorphic)
commitment functionality (our constructions are described in the FCOM-hybrid model for the sake of clarity,
but they actually only need the underlying commitments to be extractable). Functionality FCOM is described
in Figure 1. Notice that we describe a version of FCOM that operates with a set V of multiple receivers
instead of a single receiver. However, FCOM can operate as a standard two-party commitment functionality
with a single receiver by setting V = {V1}, in which case it can be realized in the CRS model under different
assumptions with security against static malicious adversaries by a number of protocols such as [13,28,8].
A recent result by Camenisch et al. [11] shows that the “canonical” random oracle commitment realizes
this functionality in the Global Random Oracle model without extra computational assumptions achieving
security against static malicious adversaries. We observe that the protocol in [11] supports multiple receivers.
In this protocol, the sender commits to a message m with randomness r by sending to the receiver the
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output c of the global random oracle when queried on (r,m) and opens by revealing (r,m), which allows
the receiver to verify by querying the global random oracle with the pair (r,m) received as opening and
checking that the response is equal to c. Given that the random oracle functionality in this model is global,
any number of receivers who have received the commitment and the opening can trivially obtain the same
result in the verification.
Functionality FAHCOM
FAHCOM interacts with a sender P , a set of receivers V = {V1, . . . , Vt} and an adversary S and proceeds as
follows:
– Commit Phase: The length of the committed messages λ is fixed and known to all parties.
• If P is honest, upon receiving a message (commit, sid, ssid, P, V ) from P , sample a random m← {0, 1}λ,
record the tuple (ssid, P, V,m), send the message (commit, sid, ssid, P, V,m) to P and send the message
(receipt, sid, ssid, P, V ) to every receiver Vi ∈ V and S. Ignore any future commit messages with the same
ssid from P to V .
• If P is corrupted, upon receiving a message (commit, sid, ssid, P, V,m) from P , where m ∈ {0, 1}λ,
record the tuple (ssid, P, V,m) and send the message (receipt, sid, ssid, P, V ) to every receiver Vi ∈ V
and S. Ignore any future commit messages with the same ssid from P to V .
• If a message (abort, sid, ssid) is received from S, the functionality halts.
– Addition: Upon receiving a message (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3, P, V ) from P : If tuples (ssid1, P, V,m1),
(ssid2, P, V,m2) were previously recorded and ssid3 is unused, record (ssid3, P, V,m1 + m2) and send the
message (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3, P, V, success) to P , every receiver Vi ∈ V and S.
– Open Phase: Upon receiving a message (reveal, sid, ssid1, . . . , ssido) from P , for every ssid ∈
{ssid1, . . . , ssido}, if a tuple (ssid, P, V,m) was previously recorded, then send (reveal, sid, ssid, P, V,m)
to every receiver Vi ∈ V and S, if not, send nothing. Finally, halt.
Fig. 2. Functionality FAHCOM
Functionality FMHCOM
Augment the functionality FAHCOM (Figure 2) with the step:
– Multiplication: Upon receiving a message (mult, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3, P, V ) from P : If tuples
(ssid1, P, V,m1), (ssid2, P, V,m2) were previously recorded and ssid3 is unused, record (ssid3, P, V,m1∗m2)
and send the message (mult, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3, P, V, success) to P , every receiver Vi ∈ V and S.
Fig. 3. Functionality FMHCOM
Ideal Functionalities: In Section 3, we construct an additively homomorphic string commitment protocol
that UC-realizes functionality FAHCOM, described in Figure 2. Similarly to a functionality of [16], FAHCOM
augments the standard multiple commitments functionality FMCOM from [14] by introducing a command
for adding two previously stored commitments and an abort command in the Commit Phase. Moreover,
FAHCOM gives an honest sender commitments to random messages instead of letting it submit a message as
input, which can be straightforwardly used to commit to arbitrary messages with additive homomorphism
as shown in [16] and discussed in Appendix C. In order to model corruptions, functionality FAHCOM lets a
corrupted sender choose the messages it wants to commit to. The abort is necessary to deal with inconsistent
commitments that could be sent by a corrupted party. However, differently from [16] or [14], this functionality
can operate with a set V of multiple receivers but only allows for a single opening of a batch of commitments,
after which it halts, not allowing further commitments, additions or openings. Notice that this functionality
can operate as a two-party commitment functionality with a single receiver by setting V = {V1}. Section 4
shows how to modify the construction of Section 3 to obtain a protocol that UC-realizes the augmented
functionality FMHCOM (Figure 3), which also allows for multiplication of committed values.
8
3 Rate-1 Linear Time Additively Homomorphic Commitments
In this section, we construct a linear time additively homomorphic commitment protocol that achieves amor-
tized rate-1 and linear time in the length of committed messages assuming an extractable (not homomorphic)
commitment and a PRG as building blocks. Protocol ΠAHCOM realizes FAHCOM, which only allows for com-
mitments to random messages. Interestingly, in this case we can achieve sublinear communication complexity
in the commitment phase while maintaining rate-1 in the opening phase. Even though committing to random
messages is useful for a number of applications (e.g. [23]) that FAHCOM is sufficient for building a protocol
ΠARBHCOM that commits to arbitrary messages achieving rate-1 and running in linear time as discussed
in [16] and Appendix C. Essentially, Protocol ΠAHCOM achieves the same asymptotic efficiency as the for-
mer best UC commitment scheme [16], while supporting multiple verifiers and without requiring OT in the
preprocessing phase, resulting in better concrete efficiency.
The main idea is to use a “delayed watchlist” mechanism where the sender first commits to seeds that will
be stretched by a PRG to instantiate the watchlist but only allows the receivers to learn the watch bits in a
later point, at which the receivers choose a random subset of the seed commitments to be opened. Basically,
the watchlist is viewed as a matrix R = R0 + R1 such that, for each row of R, the receiver learns only a
row from either R0 or R1 without revealing to the sender which one. Instead of using a number of 1-out-of-2
random OTs to obtain seeds that are stretched to generate each line of R0 or R1 in the beginning of the
protocol as in previous works, the receiver relies on simple commitments to each seed sent by the sender.
This scheme achieves rate-1 using similar techniques as [16]: first having the sender adjust the bottom bits
of the watchlist matrix R so that its columns are codewords of random strings (in the top bits of R) and
then using interactive proximity testing to convince the receiver that these columns are indeed “very close”
to codewords. In order to “open” a commitment, the sender reveals the columns from both R0 and R1
corresponding to that commitment, allowing a receiver who knows rows from each of these matrices to check
that the revealed column vector corresponds to the watchlist with high probability. However, in our new
scheme, the receiver only chooses which commitments to seeds will be revealed after the sender has sent this
opening information. Otherwise, the sender would learn which rows of R0 or R1 the receiver would check,
being able to open commitments to arbitrary messages. Protocol ΠAHCOM is described in Figures 4 and 5.
In comparison to the protocol of [16], our scheme realizes a functionality with a caveat that only one
opening of a batch of commitments is allowed (after which it terminates). However, this limited functionality
is sufficient for a number of applications that we discuss in later sections. Moreover, our protocol has two
important properties that the scheme of [16] lacks: it is public coin and supports multiple receivers. Notice
that the watch bits of the receiver (represented by a row from either R0 or R1) are chosen at random but
in public by the receiver. Hence, given an underlying commitment that support multiple receivers (e.g., the
canonical random oracle commitment scheme), it is sufficient to have the receivers run a simple commit-then-
open coin tossing protocol to choose the watch bits they will learn, then have the sender publicly open his seed
commitments. Interestingly, having the receivers broadcast their coin tossing commitments at the beginning
of the protocol (before the sender broadcasts opening information), allows the simulator to both equivocate
and extract commitments solely by extracting the underlying commitments. Notice that the simulator can
equivocate a commitment by knowing in advance the watch bits to be learned by the receivers and extract a
commitment by learning the whole watchlist, which are fixed in the sender’s seed commitments. In order to
eliminate interaction with the receivers, the random watch bits to be opened can be selected with the help
of a random oracle following the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.
Efficiency. We achieve the same asymptotic complexity as [16] but with a preprocessing phase that can
be instantiated with lower concrete complexity since it only requires extractable commitments. All phases
of the ΠAHCOM run in linear time (requiring a constant number of operations per committed bit) when
we use a linear time PRG (i.e., with a constant number of operations per generated bit [31]) a linear time
encodable code C (e.g. the one from [16]) and a linear time linear almost universal hash function H (e.g.
the one from [16]). The cost of the calls to FAHCOM is amortized over the number of commitments, which
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does not need to be very large if FAHCOM is instantiated with cheap random oracle based commitments. The
commitment phase achieves sublinear communication complexity when committing to random messages, since
a rate-1 [n, k, s]-code C is used and only W,T0,T1 (of size O(1)) are exchanged. Even if the trick from [16]
(described in Appendix C) is used to commit to arbitrary messages, only k extra bits need to be sent per
message. In this case, our protocol achieves rate-1, meaning that the amortized overhead per committed bit
is o(1) for a sufficiently large number of commitments. The opening phase as described in Figure 5 does not
achieve rate-1, since the sender has to send both A0[·, j] A1[·, j]. However, it can be modified to achieve rate-
1 using the same technique from [16], where a batch of commitments are opened by performing interactive
proximity testing on a matrix A′ containing the columns of A corresponding to the commitments to be
opened. The receivers can use another coin-tossing to select a hash function H, then the sender sends A′,
T0
′ = A0′H and T1′ = A1′H. The receivers check that A′H = T0′+T1′, that all columns in A′ are in C and
that ∆T0
′ + (I−∆)T1′ = B′H, where B′ contains the columns from B corresponding to the commitments
being checked. This technique can be proven secure with the same techniques used for the case of a corrupt
sender.
3.1 Security Analysis
For the sake of clarity, we will prove Protocol ΠAHCOM’s security in the FCOM-hybrid model, i.e. assuming
access to an ideal functionality for commitments. The proof of security for Protocol ΠAHCOM is very similar
to that of the scheme of [16], with the exception that all information the simulator needs to extract and
equivocate commitments will be obtained from FCOM instead of an OT functionality. However, our simulator
will only rely on the fact that it can extract the messages sent by the adversary to FCOM before it opens its
commitments. Essentially, our simulators only need an underlying commitment scheme that is extractable,
not a full blown UC commitment scheme (which would also allow the simulator to open the underlying
commitments to arbitrary messages). The security of Protocol ΠAHCOM is formally stated in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. Protocol ΠAHCOM UC-realizes FAHCOM in the FCOM-hybrid model with computational security
against a static adversary. Formally, there exists a simulator S such that for every static adversary A, and any
environment Z, the environment cannot distinguish ΠAHCOM composed with FCOM and A from S composed
with FAHCOM. That is, IDEALFAHCOM,S,Z ≈c HYBRIDFCOMΠAHCOM,A,Z .
Proof. Constructing a simulator for the case where all parties are honest is trivial. Hence, the theorem follows
straightforwardly from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 (Appendix D), which establish security against an adversary
that corrupts P and all but one receiver in V by constructing the simulator SP (Figure 12) or an adversary
who corrupts all receivers in V by constructing the simulator SV (Figure 13), respectively.
4 Achieving Multiplicative Homomorphism
In this section, we modify our additively homomorphic commitment protocol described Section 3 (proto-
col ΠAHCOM) so that it is also homomorphic for (coordinatewise) multiplication of messages. That is, if we
denote the scheme from Section 3 by com, our goal is that given commitments com(a), com(b) the prover can
construct a commitment com(a ∗ b). In order to do this we need to introduce a second auxiliary commitment
scheme prodcom, also described below.
Both com and prodcom can be obtained by changing the instantiation of two of the building blocks of
protocol ΠAHCOM. Namely, at the core of the construction of the commitment scheme in Section 3 (as well
as in the ones from [16,17,22]) there is a linear error correcting code C, which is used to encode the message
and which needs to have a large enough minimum distance; and there is the 2-out-of-2 additive secret sharing
scheme Add2, which is applied to each coordinate of the encoding. Our modifications are as follows: first, we
need a linear code C such that also its (Schur) square C∗2 has a large enough minimum distance. We will use
10
Protocol ΠAHCOM
Let C be a systematic binary linear [n, k, s] code, where s is the statistical security parameter and n is k+O(s).
Let H be a family of linear almost universal hash functions H : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}l. Let PRG : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}m+l
be a pseudorandom generator. Protocol ΠAHCOM is run by a sender P and a set of receivers V = {V1, . . . , Vt},
who interact with FCOM and proceed as follows:
Commitment Phase
1. On input (commit, sid, ssid1, . . . , ssidm, P, V ), P proceeds as follows:
(a) For i ∈ [n] and j ∈ {0, 1}, sample si,j $←{0, 1}` and send (commit, sid, ssidi,j , P, V, si,j) to FCOM.
(b) Compute Rj[i, ·] = PRG(si,j) and set R = R0 + R1 so that R0,R1 forms an additive secret sharing of
R.
(c) Adjust the bottom n − k rows of R so that all columns are codewords in C by constructing a matrix
W with dimensions as R and 0s in the top k rows, such that A := R + W ∈ Cm+l (recall that C is
systematic). Set A0 = R0,A1 = R1 + W and broadcast (sid, ssid1, . . . , ssidm,W) (only sending the
bottom n− k = O(s) rows).
2. Upon receiving all messages (receipt, sid, ssidi,j , P, V ) from FCOM and (sid, ssid1, . . . , ssidm,W) from P ,
every receiver Vi ∈ V proceeds as follows:
(a) Sample ri
$←{0, 1}n and r′i $←{0, 1}`, and send (commit, sid, ssid, Vi, V ′, ri) and
(commit, sid, ssid′, Vi, V ′, ri′) to FCOMa, where V ′ = P ∪ V \ Vi.
(b) Upon receiving (receipt, sid, ssid, Vj , V
′) and (receipt, sid, ssid′, Vj , V ′) from FCOM for all Vj ∈ V \ Vi,
send (reveal, sid, ssid′) to FCOM.
(c) Upon receiving (reveal, sid, ssid′, Vj , V ′, rj ′) from FCOM for all Vj ∈ V \ Vi, set r′ = r1′ ⊕ . . .⊕ rt′.
3. Upon receiving (commit, sid, ssid, Vi, V
′) and (reveal, sid, ssid′, Vj , V ′, rj ′) from FCOM for all Vj ∈ V , P
proceeds as follows:
(a) Use r′ = r1′ ⊕ . . .⊕ rt′ as a seed for a random function H ∈ H (note that we identify the function with
its matrix and all functions in H are linear).
(b) Set matrices P, P0 and P1 as the first l columns of A, A0 and A1, respectively, and remove these
columns from A, A0 and A1. Renumber the remaining columns of A, A0 and A1 from 1 and associate
each ssidi (commitment id from step 1) with a different column index in these matrices. Notice that
P = P0 + P1.
(c) For i ∈ {0, 1}, compute Ti = AiH + Pi and broadcast (sid, ssid1, . . . , ssidm,T0,T1). Note that AH +
P = A0H + P0 + A1H + P1 = T0 + T1, and AH + P ∈ Cl.
aWe abuse notation and assume that each receiver Vi in ΠAHCOM has access to an instance of FCOM that
takes as message with the appropriate length where it acts as sender and where all other receivers plus sender P
act as receivers.
Fig. 4. Commit phase for the protocol ΠAHCOM.
C as the linear code in com and C∗2 as the linear code in prodcom (with a certain caveat described below). As
for the secret sharing schemes, we will use the replicated secret sharing scheme RSS3 (described below) for
com and the additive 3-out-of-3 Add3 secret sharing scheme for prodcom. RSS3 is the secret sharing scheme
where the secret s ∈ {0, 1} is additively split into three parts, i.e., s = r0 + r1 + r2 where r0, r1 are uniformly
random and independent, and the shares are defined to be the pairs s0 = (r0, r1), s1 = (r1, r2), s2 = (r2, r0).
RSS3 is a multiplicative secret sharing scheme, which means that shares of s, s
′ can locally be transformed
into shares by Add3 of the product s · s′. More precisely, s · s′ = t0 + t1 + t2, where ti = rir′i + rir′i+1 + r′iri+1
(where sums in the indices are modulo 3) and note that all this information is contained in the i-th shares
si, s
′
i of s and s
′.
The rationale for the choices of codes and secret sharing schemes is then that from the watchlists of




1. On input (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3, P, V ), P finds indexes i and j corresponding to ssid1 and ssid2 respec-
tively and check that ssid3 is unused. P appends the column A[·, i]+A[·, j] to A, likewise appends to A0 and
A1 the sum of their i-th and j-th columns, and associates ssid3 with the new column index. P broadcasts
(add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3). Note that this maintains the properties A = A0 + A1 and A ∈ Cm′ , where
m′ is the current number of columns (after appending columns for addition results).
2. Upon receiving (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3), every receiver Vi ∈ V stores the message.
Opening
1. On input (reveal, sid, ssid1, . . . , ssido), P finds the set J = {j1, . . . , jo} of indexes associated to ssid1, . . . , ssido
and broadcasts (sid, ssid1, . . . , ssido, (A0[·, j],A1[·, j])j∈J).
2. Upon receiving message (sid, ssid1, . . . , ssido, (A0[·, j],A1[·, j])j∈J), every Vi ∈ V sends (reveal, sid, ssid) to
FCOM and waits for (reveal, sid, ssid, Vj , V ′, rj) from FCOM for all Vj ∈ V \ Vi. Vi sets r = r1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ rt and
sets the diagonal matrix ∆ such that it contains r[1], . . . , r[n] in the diagonal.
3. Upon receiving (reveal, sid, ssid, Vj , V
′, rj) from FCOM for all Vj ∈ V , P sets r = r1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ rt, sends
(reveal, sid, ssidi,r[i]) to FCOM for i ∈ [n] and halts.
4. Upon receiving (reveal, sid, ssidi,r[i], P, V, si,r[i]) from FCOM for i ∈ [n], every receiver Vj ∈ V proceeds as
follows:
(a) Compute S[i, ·] = PRG(si,r[i]), obtaining a matrix S. Note that each row of S is a row from either R0
or R1, which form an additive secret sharing of R held by P . Set B = ∆W + S. Define the matrix Q
as the first l columns of B and remove these columns from B, renumbering the remaining columns from
1. Note that, for A from the commitment phase, A = A0 + A1, B = ∆A1 + (I −∆)A0, A ∈ Cm ,
i.e., A initially held by P is additively shared and for each row index, V knows either a row from A0 or
from A1.
(b) Check that ∆T1 + (I −∆)T0 = BH + Q and that T0 + T1 ∈ Cl. If any check fails, abort. Notice
that T0,T1 form an additive sharing of AH + P, where V knows some of the shares, namely the rows
of BH + Q.
(c) For every message (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3) received from P , append B[·, j]+B[·, i] to B, where i and
j are the index corresponding to ssid1 and ssid2 respectively and associate ssid3 with the new column
index. Note that this maintains the property B = ∆A1 + (I−∆)A0.
(d) For every j ∈ J , check that A0[·, j] + A1[·, j] ∈ C and that, for i ∈ [n], it holds that B[i, j] = Ar[i][i, j]
(recall that r[i] is the i-th entry on the diagonal of ∆). If all checks succeed, for every j ∈ J , output
the first k positions in A0[·, j] + A1[·, j] as the opened string and halt. Otherwise, abort by outputting
(sid, ssidj ,⊥).
Fig. 5. Addition of commitments and opening phase for the protocol ΠAHCOM.
share (in RSS3) of the i-th coordinates (C(a))i, (C(b))i the verifier can determine the j-th share (in Add3) of
(C(a) ∗C(b))i, and note C(a) ∗C(b) is a codeword in C∗2 having a ∗ b as the vector of its first k coordinates.
But our goal is to construct com(a ∗ b) rather than prodcom(a ∗ b). We do that as follows: the prover
constructs commitments com(y), prodcom(y) of a random vector y with both commitment schemes, where
for every coordinate i, the verifier will later request to open the share with the same index ri in prodcom(y)
as he does for com(a), com(b), com(y) (note that for com that means the additive shares indexed by ri and
ri + 1). The sender needs to prove that com(y), prodcom(y) are indeed commitments to the same vector,
which will be detailed later. From com(a), com(b) the prover constructs all the shares in prodcom(a ∗ b) as
mentioned above, and then announces all three additive shares of a∗b−y. For each coordinate i, the receiver
will be able to determine the ri-th share of this vector from the watchlists of com(a), com(b), prodcom(y)
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and contrast this with the information that the prover opens. Now assuming the verifier does not abort, the
prover and verifier can simply construct com(a ∗ b) by adding a ∗ b− y to com(y). 11
We need to address however some small technical details: commitments with prodcom are to messages
of length k′ (the dimension of C∗2) rather than messages of length k and in general it can happen that
k′ > k, so when we say prodcom(y) we mean that the commitment is to a vector y||z where z is of length
k′ − k. Moreover, initially we cannot choose the random vectors we commit to since these are generated
pseudorandomly from the seeds, so the prover will need to send some correction information in order to
commit to the same value in the two schemes. In order to do that, and simultaneously prepare to prove that
com(y) and prodcom(y) are commitments to the same vector y, we define the linear code C˜ defined as the
concatenation of C and C∗2. More precisely,
C˜ = {(y, c,y, c′) : (y, c) ∈ C, (y, c′) ∈ C∗2}. (1)
The prover, having used the PRGs to construct pairs of random vectors r, r′ in {0, 1}n and additive splittings
of them, will concatenate the two vectors and send correction information z ∈ {0, 1}2n so that (r||r′)−z ∈ C˜
(as before, the first k bits of z can be taken to be 0, so the prover needs to send only 2n − k bits). Now
given a batch of supposed codewords of this form the interactive proximity testing technique is applied so
that the sender proves they are indeed codewords in C˜, and therefore they are associated to commitments
(com(y), prodcom(y)).
Note that since the first n coordinates of the codewords in C˜ are codewords in C, this test also guarantees
all properties of the interactive proximity test for the additive case, so we do not need to perform that one
separately.
We note that d˜ = dist(C˜) ≥ dist(C∗2), 12 so in this case we will need a lower bound on dist(C∗2) to obtain
the same guarantees as in the additive case. Furthermore, a difference with the proof for the additive-only
commitment scheme is that now the verifier sees 2 out of 3 additive shares of the first n coordinates and 1 out
of 3 coordinates of the last n, which affects the cheating probabilities of a corrupt prover: we will show that
it is enough to assume that dist(C∗2) > βs, where β = 1/(log2 3−1) = 1.709... (which satisfies (2/3)β = 1/2),
in order to guarantee that the cheating prover can succeed with probability at most 2−s.
Protocol ΠMHCOM is described in Figures 6, 7 and 8. Notice that for consistency with the notation
of Section 3, we describe our fully homomorphic commitment protocol for random messages. However, a
commitment to chosen messages m can be created using the protocol ΠMHCOM simply sending c = m− a,
where a = pi[k](A[·, i]) is one of the random message that the prover gets in the commit phase of ΠMHCOM
(same technique used in Appendix C). Now, in order to allow multiplication of commitments to chosen
messages it is enough that all the players locally adjust the shares of the random messages used as OTP keys
(e.g., the prover P adds C(c) to A2[·, i] and every receiver in V adds ∆C(c) and ∆′C(c) to B[·, i] and B′[·, i],
respectively) and then execute the multiplication step as detailed in Figure 7.
Finally notice that for the sake of simplicity, in the commit phase of Protocol ΠMHCOM we use the same
notation and the same construction both for random messages that are actually input to commitments (or used
to construct a commitment to a chosen message as explained above) and for the auxiliary random messages
that are needed in the multiplication step (i.e., y in the notation used in the introduction of this section),
so that all those messages are encoded in columns of the big matrix A˜. However, committing with prodcom,
11More precisely, the last share of each coordinate of C(y) is added with the corresponding (now public) coordinate
of C(a ∗ b− y).
12One could be tempted to think that the tighter lower bound dist(C˜) ≥ dist(C) + dist(C∗2) holds, but this is
not necessarily true if the dimension k′ of C∗2 is larger than k, as in that case there will be codewords of the form
(0k,0n−k,0k, c′) where c′ 6= 0n−k. Indeed take (0k, c′) to be the encoding by C∗2 of a vector (0k||z) for a nonzero
z ∈ {0, 1}k′−k
13
and hence creating and manipulating the last n rows of the matrix A˜ (what we call Aˆ), is only necessary for
the random messages used in the multiplication step, and could be saved for the remaining random messages.
On the other hand, the current structure of the commit phase, where we do not distinguish between the two
roles for the random messages, allows us to use only a single interactive proximity test instead of two (i.e.,
one for C as in protocol ΠAHCOM to guarantee the additive property and another one for C˜ and the auxiliary
random messages to guarantee that the same value y is encoded using C and C∗2).
4.1 Efficiency
Since we choose to commit to every random message with both com and prodcom, the total length of the
commitment will be 2n− k + o(k) bits per message of k bits. For chosen messages we need to add an extra
k bits per message for a total of 2n bits. If C has rate R, our commitments have then rate R/2. Moreover,
for multiplying two commitments the prover needs to have created an additional commitment of a random
message with both com and prodcom (hence communicating 2n bits), and then communicate all shares of a
related commitment with prodcom (thewi’s in the protocol), which amounts to 3n bits. So the communication
of this step is 5n bits. The question is then what rates we can have under our new requirements on dist(C∗2).
Asymptotical families of binary codes {Cn} with constant rate (of Cn) and constant relative minimum
distance of C∗2n exist based on algebraic geometry [29]. For fixed values of the security parameter s, the
families of cyclic codes constructed in [15], while not asymptotically good, give better rates. As an example,
for s = 60, where our protocol needs dist(C∗2) ≥ 103, Table 2 in [15] gives a [4095, 338] cyclic code with
dist(C∗2) ≥ 135, which has rate around 0.08. Hence the commitments will have rate 0.04.13 We need to send
25k bits per k-bit message we commit to, and 62.5k bits to construct a commitment to the product of two
messages.
Security Analysis. The proof of security for Protocol ΠMHCOM is similar to that of ΠAHCOM. Indeed, the
following Theorem 4 can be proved by adapting the description of simulators SP and SV from Appendix D
(resp. Figure 12 and Figure 13) to the new watchlist setting (i.e., three additive shares instead of two, of
which the verifier knows either two - in the base commitment given by matrix A - or one - in the product
commitment given by Â) and adding to both simulators the step to simulate the multiplication command (i.e.,
upon receiving (mult, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3) from Pˆ , SP executes the steps of ΠMHCOM for multiplication
and commits to a new unused ssid via FCOM; upon receiving (mult, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3, P, V, success) from
FMHCOM, SV runs the steps of an honest P exactly as in ΠMHCOM). More details are given in Appendix E.
Theorem 4. Protocol ΠMHCOM UC realizes FMHCOM in the FCOM-hybrid model with computational security
against a static adversary. Formally, there exists a simulator S such that for every static adversary A, and any
environment Z, the environment cannot distinguish ΠMHCOM composed with FCOM and A from S composed
with FMHCOM. That is, IDEALFMHCOM,S,Z ≈c HYBRIDFCOMΠMHCOM,A,Z .
5 Applications to Efficient Zero-Knowledge Arguments
In this section, we outline how to use a variant of the homomorphic commitments constructed in Section
3 and 4 to compile a certain class of public coin interactive proof system into public coin honest-verifier
zero-knowledge proof systems. Using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, we can convert such a zero-knowledge proof
system into a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system. As an application, we can improve a recent
construction of zkSNARKs [32] in a certain parameter regime. Specifically, the zkSNARK construction of [32]
13And naturally from this one can also obtain a [4095 · `, 338 · `]-code with the same minimum distance of its square,
by simply applying the [4095, 338] to each block of 338 bits of the message.
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Let C be a systematic binary linear [n, k] code, such that C∗2 is also systematic and satisfies dist(C∗2) ≥ βs,
where β = 1/(log2 3 − 1) and s is the statistical security parameter. Let C˜ be the code defined in (1). Let H be
a family of linear almost universal hash functions H : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}l. Let PRG : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}m+l be a
pseudorandom generator. Protocol ΠMHCOM is run by a sender P and a set of receivers V = {V1, . . . , Vt}, who
interact with FCOM as follows:
Commitment Phase
1. On input (commit, sid, ssid1, . . . , ssidm, P, V ), P proceeds as follows:
(a) For i ∈ [n] and j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, sample si,j $←{0, 1}`, ŝi,j $←{0, 1}` and send (commit, sid, ssidi,j , P, V, si,j),
(commit, sid, ŝsidi,j , P, V, ŝi,j) to FCOM.
(b) Compute Rj[i, ·] = PRG(si,j) and R̂j[i, ·] = PRG(ŝi,j) and set R = R0+R1+R2 and R̂ = R̂0+R̂1+R̂2.
(c) Adjust the bottom n − k rows of R so that all columns are codewords in C by constructing a matrix
W with dimensions as R and 0s in the top k rows, such that A := R + W ∈ Cm+l (recall that C is
systematic). Set A0 = R0,A1 = R1,A2 = R2 + W.
(d) Adjust R̂ so that all columns are codewords in C∗2 and the first k rows are the same as in A by
constructing a matrix Ŵ with dimensions as R̂ such that Â := R̂ + Ŵ ∈ (C∗2)m+l and Â[i, ·] = A[i, ·]
for all i ∈ [k]. Set Â0 = R̂0, Â1 = R̂1, Â2 = R̂2 + Ŵ and broadcast (sid, ssid1, . . . , ssidm,W,Ŵ)
(sending the bottom n− k rows of W and the entire matrix Ŵ).
2. Upon receiving all (receipt, sid, ssidi,j , P, V ) from FCOM and (sid, ssid1, . . . , ssidm,W,Ŵ) from P , every
Vi ∈ V proceeds as follows:
(a) Sample ri
$←Zn3 , ri′ $←{0, 1}` and send (commit, sid, ssid, Vi, V ′, ri) and (commit, sid, ssid′, Vi, V ′, ri′) to
FCOM, where V ′ = P ∪ V \ Vi.
(b) and (c) as is the commit phase of ΠAHCOM (Figure 4).
3. Upon receiving (commit, sid, ssid, Vi, V
′) and (reveal, sid, ssid′, Vj , V ′, rj ′) from FCOM for all Vj ∈ V , P
proceeds as follows:
(a) Use r′ = r1′ ⊕ . . .⊕ rt′ as a seed for a random function H ∈ H.










for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Note that A˜ ∈ C˜m+l and A˜ =
A˜0 + A˜1 + A˜2. Set the matrices P˜ and P˜i as the first l columns of A˜ and A˜i, respectively, and remove
these columns from A˜, A˜i, A, Ai, Â, Âi for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Renumber the remaining columns from 1 and
associate each commitment ssidi (commitment id from step 1) with a different column in these matrices.
Notice that P˜ = P˜0 + P˜1+P˜2.
(c) For i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, compute the matrix T˜i = A˜iH + P˜i and broadcast (sid, ssid1, . . . , ssidm, T˜0, T˜1, T˜2).
Note that A˜H + P˜ = T˜0 + T˜1 + T˜2, and A˜H + P˜ ∈ C˜l.
Fig. 6. Commit phase for the protocol ΠMHCOM.
uses additively homomorphic vector commitments14 to transform a public coin interactive proof system into a
zero-knowledge protocol. The commitments in [32] are instantiated using number-theoretic assumptions. The
construction of [32] is general enough that it can be instantiated with homomorphic commitment schemes
with some additional properties. We remark though that [32] utilizes an additional optimization which relies
on compressing homomorphic commitments, which is not available in our setting.
Our main observation is that for this application the unveil of the commitments in the protocol of [32] can
be delayed until the very end of the protocol, which makes this protocol compatible with our commitment
scheme.
The notion of interactive proof system we focus on will be resettably sound public coin interactive proofs
with algebraic verifier. Such a proof system proceeds in t rounds, where in each round i the prover sends a




1. On input (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3, P, V ), P finds indexes i and j corresponding to ssid1 and ssid2 re-
spectively and check that ssid3 is unused. P appends the column A[·, i] + A[·, j] to A, likewise appends to
A0, A1, A2 the sum of their i-th and j-th columns, and associates ssid3 with the new column index. P
broadcasts (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3) to V .
2. Upon receiving (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3), every Vi ∈ V stores the message.
Multiplication of Commitments
1. On input (mult, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3, P, V ), P finds indexes i and j corresponding to ssid1 and ssid2 re-
spectively and check that ssid3 is unused. Then, P proceeds as follows:
(a) For l ∈ {0, 1, 2}, compute vl = Al[·, i]∗Al[·, j]+Al[·, i]∗Al+1[·, j]+Al+1[·, i]∗Al[·, j]. Note that v0,v1,v2
are shares of A[·, i]∗A[·, j] in the scheme Add3 and known to P only. Let h be the index of the first unused
column from A and Â, compute wl = vl− Âl[·, h] for l = 0, 1, 2 and broadcast (sid, ssid, h,w0,w1,w2)
to V . Note that w0,w1,w2 are shares of A[·, i] ∗A[·, j]− Â[·, h] in the scheme Add3 and are known to
P ∪ V .
(b) Let u = pi[k](w0+w1+w2) (i.e., u consists of the first k components of A[·, i]∗A[·, j]− Â[·, h]), append
the columns A[·, h] + C(u) and A2[·, h] + C(u) to A and A2, respectively. Append the column Ai[·, h] to
Ai for i = 0, 1 and associate ssid3 with the new column index. Note that since pi[k](Â[·, h])+pi[k](A[·, h]),
for l ∈ {1, . . . , k} the l-th component of the newly appended column in A is equal to A[l, i] ∗ A[l, j].
Broadcast (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3) to V .
2. Upon receiving (mult, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3), every Vi ∈ V stores the message.
Note that this maintains the properties A = A0 + A1 + A2 and A ∈ Cm′ , where m′ is the current number of
columns.
Opening (Part 1)
1. On input (reveal, sid, ssid1, . . . , ssido), P finds the set J = {j1, . . . , jo} of indexes associated to ssid1, . . . , ssido
and broadcasts (sid, ssid1, . . . , ssido, (A0[·, j],A1[·, j],A2[·, j])j∈J).
2. Upon receiving message (sid, ssid1, . . . , ssido, (A0[·, j],A1[·, j],A2[·, j])j∈J), every receiver Vi ∈ V sends
(reveal, sid, ssid) to FCOM and waits for (reveal, sid, ssid, Vj , V ′, rj) from FCOM for all Vj ∈ V \ Vi. Vi sets
r = r1 + · · ·+ rt (where the sum is in Zn3 ) and sets the diagonal matrices ∆,∆′ such that the i-th element
in ∆ (resp. ∆′) is 1 if r[i] = 2 (resp. r[i] = 1) and 0 otherwise.
3. Upon receiving (reveal, sid, ssid, Vj , V
′, rj) from FCOM for all Vj ∈ V , P sets r = r1 + . . . + rt, sends
(reveal, sid, ssidi,r[i]), (reveal, sid, ssidi,r[i]+1) and (reveal, sid, ŝsidi,r[i]) to FCOM for i = 1, . . . , n and halts.
Fig. 7. Addition and multiplication steps, and opening phase for the protocol ΠMHCOM.
message pi, upon which the verifier answers with a uniformly random message vi. We require all the messages
pi and vi to be vectors over a field F. After the conversation is over, the verifier evaluates a system of low
degree polynomials F1, . . . , Fs in the pi and vi and accepts if all Fi evaluate to 0, otherwise it rejects. At the
heart of this kind of protocol is the sum-check protocol, which lets a prover prove statements of the form∑
x∈{0,1}n P (x) = L, where P ∈ F[X1, . . . , Xn] is a low-degree polynomial and L ∈ F.
While it can be shown that any constant round proof system can be immediately compiled into a non-
interactive argument system via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [20], super-constant round protocols need to fulfil
a stronger soundness property called resettable soundness for the Fiat-Shamir transform to result in a sound
protocol.
We will now outline how to compile any resettable sound public coin interactive proof system into an
honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof systems in a way that only slightly increases the communication com-




4. Upon receiving the messages (reveal, sid, ssidi,r[i], P, V, si,r[i]), (reveal, sid, ssidi,r[i]+1, P, V, si,r[i]+1) and
(reveal, sid, ŝsidi,r[i], P, V, ŝi,r[i]) from FCOM for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, every receiver Vj ∈ V proceeds as follows:





S, S′ and Ŝ. Note for each i, the i-th row of S, S′, Ŝ will equal the i-th row of Rr[i], Rr[i]+1, R̂r[i]
respectively. Set B = ∆W + S, B′ = ∆′W + S′ and B̂ = ∆Ŵ + Ŝ. Define the matricesa Q, Q′, Q̂
as the first l columns of B, B′, B̂ and remove these columns from the latter matrices, renumbering the
remaining columns from 1.
(b) Notice that T˜0, T˜1, T˜2 form an additive sharing of A˜H + P˜, and the verifiers know some of the shares,
namely the rows of BH + Q and B′H + Q′ (shares for the first n rows of A˜H + P˜) and the rows of





. Check that BH + Q =
∆T2 + ∆
′T1 + (1 − ∆ − ∆′)T0, B′H + Q′ = ∆T0 + ∆′T2 + (1 − ∆ − ∆′)T1 and B̂H + Q̂ =
∆T̂2 + ∆
′T̂1 + (1−∆−∆′)T̂0, and that T0 + T1 + T2 ∈ C`. If any check fails, abort.
(c) For every (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3) received from P , append B[·, a]+B[·, b] to B and append B′[·, a]+
B′[·, b] to B′ (a, b are the index corresponding to ssid1, ssid2 respectively and ssid3 is associated with
the new column index). For every (mult, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3) received from P :
– given (sid, ssid, h,w0,w1,w2), check that w0 +w1 +w2 ∈ C∗2 and wr[i] = B[·, a] ∗B[·, b] + B[·, a] ∗
B′[·, b] + B′[·, a] ∗B[·, b] + B̂[·, h];
– let u = pi[k](w0 + w1 + w2), append the columns B[·, h] + ∆C(u) and B′[·, h] + ∆′C(u) to B and
B′, respectively.
Note that the properties detailed in footnotea are maintained.
(d) For every j ∈ J , check that A0[·, j] + A1[·, j] + A2[·, j] ∈ C and that, for i = 1, . . . , n, it holds that
B[i, j] = Ar[i][i, j] and B
′[i, j] = Ar[i]+1[i, j]. If all checks succeed, for every j ∈ J , output the first k
positions in A0[·, j] + A1[·, j] + A2[·, j] as the opened string and halts. Otherwise, abort by outputting
(sid, ssidj ,⊥).
a Note that we have A = A0 + A1 + A2, B = ∆A2 + ∆
′A1 + (1−∆−∆′)A0 and B′ = ∆A0 + ∆′A2 +
(1 −∆ −∆′)A1. This means that A held by P is shared in the replicated secret sharing scheme RSS3 and for
each row index, V knows one share (i.e., V knows the corresponding rows from exactly two of the matrices A0,
A1, A2). Moreover, Â = Â0 + Â1 + Â2 and B̂ = ∆Â2 + ∆
′Â1 + (I−∆−∆′)Â0 i.e., Â held by P is shared in
the additive secret sharing scheme Add3 and for each row index, V knows one share (V knows the corresponding
row from exactly one of the matrices Â0, Â1, Â2).
Fig. 8. Opening phase (continued) for the protocol ΠMHCOM.
The basic idea of the transformation is simple and follows the paradigm of committed conversations [5]. The
prover and verifier run the interactive proof system with the modification that instead of sending its messages
in the plain, the prover sends commitments to its messages. After the protocol is over the prover convinces the
verifier that the commitment values pass the verification equations F1, . . . , Fs. The homomorphic property of
the commitments will be used to implement this check efficiently. While our protocol ΠMHCOM does support
evaluation of low degree polynomials, we will focus on linear/affine verification equations F1, . . . , Fs and will
therefore rely on the additively homomorphic commitment scheme ΠAHCOM.
In our construction, we will use protocol ΠAHCOM with several modifications which are discussed in
Appendix G.
Instantiation We will now discuss instantiating the hyrax protocol of [32] with the modified version of the
commitment scheme ΠAHCOM.
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To prove satisfiability of an algebraic circuit of depth d, width G and input/witness size |w|, the hyrax
protocol has proof size (10d log(G) +
√|w|) · κ assuming that a group element in a DLOG-hard group G has
size κ. The verifier runtime is O(
√|w| + d · log(G)) whereas the prover runtime is linear in the size of the
circuit C.
Replacing the DLOG-based homomorphic commitment in the hyrax protocol with our commitment pro-
tocol ΠAHCOM as outlined above, the main optimization which is not available is compression of the witness
w. Consequently, in our instantiation proof size will depend linearly on the size of the witness |w|.
One of the key ideas in the hyrax protocol is to reduce all algebraic relations between commitments to
linear relations between vector commitments, an idea also used in bulletproofs [10]. In this way, general
algebraic relations can be proven using a protocol which just supports linear relations between vectors. This
transformation only incurs a small constant factor additional overhead. Omitting details, there are three
main steps. In the first step reduce multiplicative relations to linear relations, in the second step show that
many linear relations can be compressed into a single linear relation, and in. the third step step reduce
linear relations between commitments to linear relations between vector commitments. All three steps are
implemented using a Schnorr-style protocol. In [32] these transformations are provided for the concrete case
of DLOG-based commitments, but these ideas can be implemented using arbitrary homomorphic vector
commitments.
The main improvement of our protocol over [32] is that we only rely on simple private key primitives.
On the turn side, our vector-commitments are not compressing, which leads to the proof-size to depend
linearly on the witness-size |w| instead of √|w|. However, the proof size does not depend multiplicatively on
the computational security parameter κ, but rather on |F|, which is a statistical security parameter an can
therefore be chosen much smaller. Consequently, we get an advantage in terms of proof-size whenever the
proof-size is dominated by d rather than |w|.
6 Applications to Secure Multiparty Computation
6.1 Committed MPC
A recent work by Frederiksen et al. [21] has shown that additively homomorphic commitments can be lever-
aged to construct efficient preprocessed MPC. However, their “Committed MPC” protocol requires a mul-
tiparty commitment functionality that allows for multiple senders and for computing linear combinations
between commitments generated by different senders. We will show a generic construction of such a protocol
from functionality FAHCOM that can be instantiated with Protocol ΠAHCOM, achieving significantly better
efficiency than the construction of [21].
Functionality FMSAHCOM. Our protocol will realize the multiparty additively homomorphic commitment
functionality from [21] with the difference that it will only allow for a single batch verification of opened
commitments. While it allows for openings before verification, the validity of those will not be ensured by
FMSAHCOM, which will let the adversary choose any value to be provided as an opening. FMSAHCOM will allow
for a single verification phase where all parties check whether the openings they have received are valid, after
which the functionality halts. This functionality is sufficient for realizing the “Committed MPC” protocol
of [21], since the parties can use the intermediate (non-verified) openings to compute the protocol and in the
end verify that the result is correct. Other small differences is that we omit the Partial Open interface used
to open a commitment to a single receiver and provide an interface for single addition operations. Notice
that our procedures for opening a commitment for all receivers can be trivially adapted to opening towards
a specific receiver by sending the corresponding messages only to that receiver and that single additions
of commitments can be trivially used for computing linear combinations as in the functionality of [21]. We
present Functionality FMSAHCOM in Figure 9.
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Functionality FMSAHCOM
FMSAHCOM is parameterized by n ∈ N. FMSAHCOM interacts with a set of parties P = {P1, . . . , Pt} and an
adversary S (who may abort at any time):
– Init Upon receiving (init, sid) from all parties in P , forward the message to S and initialize empty lists raw
and actual.
– Commit: Upon receiving (commit, sid, I) from all parties in P where I is a set of unused identifiers, for
every ssid ∈ I, sample a random xssid $←Fk, set raw[ssid] = xssid and send (commit− recorded, sid, I) to all
parties P and S.
– Input: Upon receiving (input, sid, ssid, Pi,y) from Pi ∈ P and (input, sid, ssid, Pi) from all other parties in
P , if raw[ssid] = xssid 6=⊥, set raw[ssid] =⊥, set actual[ssid] = y and send (input− recorded, sid, ssid, Pi) to
all parties in P and S.
– Random: Upon receiving (random, sid, ssid) from all parties in P , if raw[ssid] = xssid 6=⊥, set actual[ssid] =
xssid, set raw[ssid] =⊥ and send (random− recorded, sid, ssid) to all parties P and S.
– Addition: Upon receiving a message (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3) from all parties in P : if actual[ssid] =
xssid 6=⊥ for ssid ∈ {ssid1, ssid2} and raw[ssid3] = actual[ssid3] =⊥, set actual[ssid3] = actual[ssid1] +
actual[ssid2] and send the message (add− recorded, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3) to all P and S.
– Open: Upon receiving (open, sid, ssid) from all parties P , if actual[ssid] = xssid 6=⊥, send
(open, sid, ssid,xssid) to S. If S answers with (open, sid, ssid,x′ssid), send (open, sid, ssid,x′ssid) to all parties
in P .
– Verify: Upon receiving a message (verify, sid) from all parties in P , let ssid1, . . . , ssido be the ssids of opened
commitments (i.e. for which (open, sid, ssid,x′ssid) messages were sent). For ssid ∈ {ssid1, . . . , ssido}, set
b = 1 if actual[ssid] = x′ssid or b = 0 if not, and send (verify, sid, ssid, b) to every party in P .
Fig. 9. Functionality for additively homomorphic commitments with multiple senders.
Protocol ΠMSAHCOM. While a generic construction of such a protocol from any two-party additively homo-
morphic commitment scheme is presented in [21], we can significantly simplify and improve the efficiency
of this construction departing from a multi-receiver scheme as defined in FAHCOM. We construct a protocol
where every party acts both as sender and receiver of all commitments. In this protocol, each party first uses
FAHCOM to commit to random values towards the others. A joint random commitment in the new multi-
sender protocol is defined as the commitment to the sum of all random messages contained in the individual
commitments by each party. Linear combinations between joint commitments can be computed by having
each party (acting as a sender in the underlying multi-receiver commitment scheme) compute the same linear
combination on its own “shares” of the joint commitment. Opening a joint commitment works by having
each party open their individual commitments, allowing everybody to compute the joint commitment as the
sum of the opened messages. Using standard tricks, these joint random commitments can be easily turned
into commitments to arbitrary messages.
Security Analysis: To verify correctness, notice that ΠMSAHCOM computes a random commitment identified
by ssid as a commitment to
∑
i∈[t] raw
i[ssid], where rawi[ssid] is supposed to be the value obtained by Pi
from F iAHCOM. In the verification procedure, all parties obtain xj for j ∈ [t] directly from F jAHCOM, being able
to verify that the previously opened commitments are indeed valid. If a commitment identified by ssid is set
to an arbitrary message y, the sender Pj holding y broadcasts w = y −
∑
i∈[t] raw
i[ssid], which also allows
all parties to retrieve y when values rawi[ssid] are released and to verify the correctness of this opening
when xj (corresponding to raw
j [ssid]) are revealed. Notice that addition are simply computed by adding
the actuali[ssid] vectors and, since all of these vectors are linear combinations of themselves, opening and
verification of a result addition works the same way as for the other commitments.
Theorem 5. Protocol ΠMSAHCOM UC realizes FMSAHCOM in the FAHCOM-hybrid model with statistical se-
curity against a static adversary. Formally, there exists a simulator S such that for every static adversary
A, and any environment Z the following holds: IDEALFMSAHCOM,S,Z ≈s HYBRIDFAHCOMΠMSAHCOM,A,Z .
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Protocol ΠMSAHCOM
Given a set of parties P = {P1, . . . , Pt}, for each party Pi ∈ P , ΠMSAHCOM uses an instance of FAHCOM denoted
as F iAHCOM where Pi is the sender with a set of receivers Vi = P \ Pi. Parties in P = {P1, . . . , Pt} interact with
each other and with F1AHCOM, . . . ,F tAHCOM, proceeding as follows:
1. Commit On input (commit, sid, ssid, I) where I = {ssid1, . . . , ssidγ} each party Pi ∈ P , for ssid ∈ I,
sends (commit, sid, ssid, Pi, Vi) to F iAHCOM, receiving as answer (receipt, sid, ssid, Pi, Vi,xssid) and setting
rawi[ssid] = xssid and actual
i[ssid] =⊥.
2. Input On input (input, sid, ssid,y) for Pi and input (input, sid, ssid, Pj) for every Pj for j 6= i, parties P
proceed as follows:
(a) For every j ∈ [t], j 6= i, Pj aborts if actualj [ssid] 6=⊥. Otherwise, Pj sends (sid, ssid, rawj [ssid]) to Pi.
(b) Upon receiving (sid, ssid, rawj [ssid]) from Pj for every j ∈ [t], j 6= i, Pi sets x = ∑j∈[t] rawj [ssid],
w = y − x, actuali[ssid] = w and broadcasts (sid, ssid, Pi,w).
(c) Upon receiving (sid, ssid, Pi,w), every party Pj ∈ P sets actualj [ssid] = w.
3. Random: On input (random, sid, ssid), if actuali[ssid] =⊥, each party Pi ∈ P sets actuali[ssid] = 0k.
4. Addition: On input (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3), if actual
i[ssid1] 6=⊥, actuali[ssid2] 6=⊥ and
actuali[ssid3] =⊥, every party Pi ∈ P sets actuali[ssid3] = actuali[ssid1] + actuali[ssid2]
and sends (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3, Pi, Vi) to F iAHCOM. All parties proceed after receiving
(add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3, Pi, Vi, success) from F iAHCOM.
5. Open: On input (open, sid, ssid), each Pi ∈ P broadcasts (sid, ssid, rawi[ssid]). Upon receiving
(sid, ssid, rawj [ssid]) for j ∈ [t], j 6= i, each party Pi ∈ P computes x′ = actuali[ssid] + ∑j∈[t] rawj [ssid]
and outputs (sid, ssid,x′).
6. Verify: On input (verify, sid), let ssid1, . . . , ssido be the ssids of opened commitments (i.e. for which
(open, sid, ssid) inputs were received), every Pi ∈ P sends (reveal, sid, ssid1, . . . , ssido) to F iAHCOM. For every
ssid ∈ {ssid1, . . . , ssido}, upon receiving (reveal, sid, ssid, Pj , Vj ,xj) for j ∈ [t], j 6= i, each party Pi ∈ P sets
xi = raw
i[ssid], computes x = actuali[ssid] +
∑
j∈[t] xj , sets b = 1 if x
′ = x (where x′ is the value previously
opened) or b = 0 if not, and outputs (verify, sid, ssid, b).
Fig. 10. Protocol ΠMSAHCOM
Proof (Sketch). Notice thatΠMSAHCOM only performs operations with random values obtained from F iAHCOM.
Hence, upon learning the opening of any commitment from FMSAHCOM, the simulator can simply cheat in
the openings of random values from the emulated F iAHCOM in order to equivocate a commitment. Similarly,
if it needs to extract any commitment done in ΠMSAHCOM, the simulator can compute it from the messages
sent by the adversary in the protocol and the messages the adversary obtains from the emulated F iAHCOM.
Efficiency: Notice that our construction of ΠMSAHCOM using FAHCOM as a black box actually communicates
more bits than necessary. In ΠMSAHCOM’s opening phase, all parties broadcast the messages in commitments
generated by FAHCOM and, later on, verify these openings by opening the commitments through FAHCOM,
sending the same messages again. If instantiated with ΠAHCOM, our construction can be made more efficient
by having the parties broadcast columns A0[·, j],A1[·, j] (Step 1 of ΠAHCOM’s opening phase) during the
opening phase of ΠMSAHCOM. Later on, for verification, the parties only need to execute the remaining steps
of the opening phase of ΠAHCOM in order to verify that the columns they have previously obtained are
actually valid. In a setting with t parties, our protocol only requires t individual multi-receiver commitments,
where the construction of [21] requires t2 two-party commitments. Their constructions also require extra
communication in the order of O(skt2) for generating a batch of m commitments, where s is the security
parameter and k is the message length. Moreover, instantiating the construction of [21] with the previously
best two-party additively homomorphic commitments [16] implies a high cost of nt2 OTs for the setup phase
(with an underlying [n, k, s] code) and extra communication in the order of O(nmt2) bits for generating a
batch of m commitments to random messages. On the other hand, our construction instantiated with protocol
ΠAHCOM can do the same with nt calls to FCOM (which can be instantiated much cheaper than an OT by
calling a random oracle and sending its output) and extra communication in the order of O(smt) bits. In
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the opening phase, the construction of [21] requires communication in the order of O(nt2) bits, while our
construction only requires communication in the order of O(nt) bits, assuming broadcast channels.
6.2 Insured MPC
Recently, Andrychowicz et al. [2] started a line of work [6,27,7,4] that deals with the problem of fairness in
multiparty computation by combining MPC protocols with cryptocurrencies. The main idea is to provide
financial incentives for the parties to act honestly. In a nutshell, each party provides a security deposit before
the protocol execution or right before the outputs are revealed. After that, the protocol is executed and if no
problem happens, then the security deposits are reimbursed. On the other hand, if some problem happens,
the security deposit of the parties who misbehaved/aborted is used to compensate the remaining parties. This
combination of MPC and cryptocurrency techniques also allows to have both inputs and outputs consisting
of both data and monetary assets and distribute the funds according to the output of the computation.
The most efficient solution to date, due to Baum et al. [4], uses a publicly verifiable additively homomorphic
multi-receiver commitment scheme as a central building block. By combining such commitment scheme
with a smart contract, an authenticated bulletin board, and a MPC scheme that output verifiably secret
shared outputs, they obtained an efficient MPC protocol with public detection of cheating behavior that
financially punishes misbehaving parties. Nevertheless, the main bottleneck of their protocol is the multi-party
commitment scheme, as its complexity grows quadratically in the number of parties. With our techniques it
is possible to greatly improve the performance of publicly verifiable additively homomorphic multi-receiver
commitments.
The functionality for publicly verifiable additively homomorphic commitment FPVHCOM is described in the
Appendix F and the set of external verifiers U is allowed to be dynamic by adding procedures for registering
and deregistering parties following the approach of Badertscher et al. [3]. Assuming that the underlying
commitment protocol ΠCOM used as a building block is publicly verifiable, Protocol ΠAHCOM is trivially
publicly verifiable when all the messages are posted to an authenticated bulletin board, straightforwardly
realizing functionality FPVHCOM. The “canonical” random oracle commitment scheme (that realizes FCOM
in the programmable Global Random Oracle model without extra computational assumptions according to
a recent result by Camenisch et al. [11]) is a clear example of a scheme that is publicly verifiable when the
messages are posted to an authenticated bulletin board, and ΠAHCOM instantiated using that commitment
scheme can be used to remarkably improve the performance of publicly verifiable additively homomorphic
commitments and consequently of the Insured MPC protocol of Baum et al. [4]. The efficiency improvements
achieved in this application are similar to those of the Committed MPC case, since the previously best publicly
verifiable multi-receiver additively homomorphic commitment protocol of [4] has a very similar structure to
the commitment protocol of [21].
References
1. Scott Ames, Carmit Hazay, Yuval Ishai, and Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam. Ligero: Lightweight
sublinear arguments without a trusted setup. In Bhavani M. Thuraisingham, David Evans, Tal Malkin, and
Dongyan Xu, editors, ACM CCS 17, pages 2087–2104. ACM Press, October / November 2017.
2. Marcin Andrychowicz, Stefan Dziembowski, Daniel Malinowski, and Lukasz Mazurek. Secure multiparty compu-
tations on bitcoin. In 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 443–458. IEEE Computer Society
Press, May 2014.
3. Christian Badertscher, Ueli Maurer, Daniel Tschudi, and Vassilis Zikas. Bitcoin as a transaction ledger: A com-
posable treatment. In Jonathan Katz and Hovav Shacham, editors, CRYPTO 2017, Part I, volume 10401 of
LNCS, pages 324–356. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2017.
4. Carsten Baum, Bernardo David, and Rafael Dowsley. Insured mpc: Efficient secure multiparty computation with
punishable abort. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2018/942, 2018. https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/942.
21
5. Michael Ben-Or, Oded Goldreich, Shafi Goldwasser, Johan H˚astad, Joe Kilian, Silvio Micali, and Phillip Rogaway.
Everything provable is provable in zero-knowledge. In Shafi Goldwasser, editor, CRYPTO’88, volume 403 of LNCS,
pages 37–56. Springer, Heidelberg, August 1990.
6. Iddo Bentov and Ranjit Kumaresan. How to use bitcoin to design fair protocols. In Juan A. Garay and Rosario
Gennaro, editors, CRYPTO 2014, Part II, volume 8617 of LNCS, pages 421–439. Springer, Heidelberg, August
2014.
7. Iddo Bentov, Ranjit Kumaresan, and Andrew Miller. Instantaneous decentralized poker. In Tsuyoshi Takagi and
Thomas Peyrin, editors, ASIACRYPT 2017, Part II, volume 10625 of LNCS, pages 410–440. Springer, Heidelberg,
December 2017.
8. Olivier Blazy, Ce´line Chevalier, David Pointcheval, and Damien Vergnaud. Analysis and improvement of Lindell’s
UC-secure commitment schemes. In Michael J. Jacobson Jr., Michael E. Locasto, Payman Mohassel, and Reihaneh
Safavi-Naini, editors, ACNS 13, volume 7954 of LNCS, pages 534–551. Springer, Heidelberg, June 2013.
9. Lu´ıs T. A. N. Branda˜o. Very-efficient simulatable flipping of many coins into a well - (and a new universally-
composable commitment scheme). In Chen-Mou Cheng, Kai-Min Chung, Giuseppe Persiano, and Bo-Yin Yang,
editors, PKC 2016, Part II, volume 9615 of LNCS, pages 297–326. Springer, Heidelberg, March 2016.
10. Benedikt Bu¨nz, Jonathan Bootle, Dan Boneh, Andrew Poelstra, Pieter Wuille, and Greg Maxwell. Bulletproofs:
Short proofs for confidential transactions and more. In 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages
315–334. IEEE Computer Society Press, May 2018.
11. Jan Camenisch, Manu Drijvers, Tommaso Gagliardoni, Anja Lehmann, and Gregory Neven. The wonderful world
of global random oracles. In Jesper Buus Nielsen and Vincent Rijmen, editors, EUROCRYPT 2018, Part I,
volume 10820 of LNCS, pages 280–312. Springer, Heidelberg, April / May 2018.
12. Ran Canetti. Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols. In 42nd FOCS,
pages 136–145. IEEE Computer Society Press, October 2001.
13. Ran Canetti and Marc Fischlin. Universally composable commitments. In Joe Kilian, editor, CRYPTO 2001,
volume 2139 of LNCS, pages 19–40. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2001.
14. Ran Canetti, Yehuda Lindell, Rafail Ostrovsky, and Amit Sahai. Universally composable two-party and multi-
party secure computation. In 34th ACM STOC, pages 494–503. ACM Press, May 2002.
15. Ignacio Cascudo. On squares of cyclic codes. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 65(2):1034–1047, 2019.
16. Ignacio Cascudo, Ivan Damg˚ard, Bernardo David, Nico Do¨ttling, and Jesper Buus Nielsen. Rate-1, linear time and
additively homomorphic UC commitments. In Matthew Robshaw and Jonathan Katz, editors, CRYPTO 2016,
Part III, volume 9816 of LNCS, pages 179–207. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2016.
17. Ignacio Cascudo, Ivan Damg˚ard, Bernardo Machado David, Irene Giacomelli, Jesper Buus Nielsen, and Roberto
Trifiletti. Additively homomorphic UC commitments with optimal amortized overhead. In Jonathan Katz, editor,
PKC 2015, volume 9020 of LNCS, pages 495–515. Springer, Heidelberg, March / April 2015.
18. Ivan Damg˚ard, Bernardo Machado David, Irene Giacomelli, and Jesper Buus Nielsen. Compact VSS and efficient
homomorphic UC commitments. In Palash Sarkar and Tetsu Iwata, editors, ASIACRYPT 2014, Part II, volume
8874 of LNCS, pages 213–232. Springer, Heidelberg, December 2014.
19. Erez Druk and Yuval Ishai. Linear-time encodable codes meeting the gilbert-varshamov bound and their crypto-
graphic applications. In Moni Naor, editor, ITCS 2014, pages 169–182. ACM, January 2014.
20. Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems.
In Andrew M. Odlyzko, editor, CRYPTO’86, volume 263 of LNCS, pages 186–194. Springer, Heidelberg, August
1987.
21. Tore K. Frederiksen, Benny Pinkas, and Avishay Yanai. Committed MPC - maliciously secure multiparty com-
putation from homomorphic commitments. In Michel Abdalla and Ricardo Dahab, editors, PKC 2018, Part I,
volume 10769 of LNCS, pages 587–619. Springer, Heidelberg, March 2018.
22. Tore Kasper Frederiksen, Thomas P. Jakobsen, Jesper Buus Nielsen, and Roberto Trifiletti. On the complexity
of additively homomorphic UC commitments. In Eyal Kushilevitz and Tal Malkin, editors, TCC 2016-A, Part I,
volume 9562 of LNCS, pages 542–565. Springer, Heidelberg, January 2016.
23. Tore Kasper Frederiksen, Thomas Pelle Jakobsen, Jesper Buus Nielsen, Peter Sebastian Nordholt, and Claudio
Orlandi. MiniLEGO: Efficient secure two-party computation from general assumptions. In Thomas Johansson
and Phong Q. Nguyen, editors, EUROCRYPT 2013, volume 7881 of LNCS, pages 537–556. Springer, Heidelberg,
May 2013.
24. Juan A. Garay, Yuval Ishai, Ranjit Kumaresan, and Hoeteck Wee. On the complexity of UC commitments. In
Phong Q. Nguyen and Elisabeth Oswald, editors, EUROCRYPT 2014, volume 8441 of LNCS, pages 677–694.
Springer, Heidelberg, May 2014.
22
25. Shafi Goldwasser, Yael Tauman Kalai, and Guy N. Rothblum. Delegating computation: interactive proofs for
muggles. In Richard E. Ladner and Cynthia Dwork, editors, 40th ACM STOC, pages 113–122. ACM Press, May
2008.
26. Yuval Ishai, Eyal Kushilevitz, Rafail Ostrovsky, and Amit Sahai. Cryptography with constant computational
overhead. In Richard E. Ladner and Cynthia Dwork, editors, 40th ACM STOC, pages 433–442. ACM Press, May
2008.
27. Aggelos Kiayias, Hong-Sheng Zhou, and Vassilis Zikas. Fair and robust multi-party computation using a global
transaction ledger. In Marc Fischlin and Jean-Se´bastien Coron, editors, EUROCRYPT 2016, Part II, volume
9666 of LNCS, pages 705–734. Springer, Heidelberg, May 2016.
28. Yehuda Lindell. Highly-efficient universally-composable commitments based on the DDH assumption. In Ken-
neth G. Paterson, editor, EUROCRYPT 2011, volume 6632 of LNCS, pages 446–466. Springer, Heidelberg, May
2011.
29. Hugues Randriambololona. Asymptotically good binary linear codes with asymptotically good self-intersection
spans. IEEE Trans. Information Theory, 59(5):3038–3045, 2013.
30. Omer Reingold, Guy N. Rothblum, and Ron D. Rothblum. Constant-round interactive proofs for delegating
computation. In Daniel Wichs and Yishay Mansour, editors, 48th ACM STOC, pages 49–62. ACM Press, June
2016.
31. Salil P. Vadhan and Colin Jia Zheng. Characterizing pseudoentropy and simplifying pseudorandom generator
constructions. In Howard J. Karloff and Toniann Pitassi, editors, 44th ACM STOC, pages 817–836. ACM Press,
May 2012.
32. Riad S. Wahby, Ioanna Tzialla, Abhi Shelat, Justin Thaler, and Michael Walfish. Doubly-efficient zkSNARKs
without trusted setup. In 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 926–943. IEEE Computer Society
Press, May 2018.
Appendix A Universal Composability
We adopt the description of the Universal Composability (UC) framework given in [17]. In this framework,
protocol security is analyzed under the real-world/ideal-world paradigm, i.e. by comparing the real world
execution of a protocol with an ideal world interaction with the primitive that it implements. The model
has a composition theorem, that basically states that UC secure protocols can be arbitrarily composed with
each other without any security compromises. This desirable property not only allows UC secure protocols
to effectively serve as building blocks for complex applications but also guarantees security in practical
environments where several protocols (or individual instances of protocols) are executed in parallel, such as
the Internet.
In the UC framework, the entities involved in both the real and ideal world executions are modeled as
probabilistic polynomial-time Interactive Turing Machines (ITM) that receive and deliver messages through
their input and output tapes, respectively. In the ideal world execution, dummy parties (possibly controlled
by an ideal adversary S referred to as the simulator) interact directly with the ideal functionality F , which
works as a trusted third party that computes the desired primitive. In the real world execution, several parties
(possibly corrupted by a real world adversary A) interact with each other by means of a protocol pi that
realizes the ideal functionality. The real and ideal executions are controlled by the environment Z, an entity
that delivers inputs and reads the outputs of the individual parties, the adversary A and the simulator S.
After a real or ideal execution, Z outputs a bit, which is considered as the output of the execution. The
rationale behind this framework lies in showing that the environment Z (that represents all the things that
happen outside of the protocol execution) is not able to efficiently distinguish between the real and ideal
executions, thus implying that the real world protocol is as secure as the ideal functionality.
We denote by REALpi,A,Z(κ, z, r¯) the output of the environment Z in the real-world execution of pro-
tocol pi between n parties with an adversary A under security parameter κ, input z and randomness
r¯ = (rZ , rA, rP1 , . . . , rPn), where (z, rZ), rA and rPi are respectively related to Z, A and party i. Anal-
ogously, we denote by IDEALF,S,Z(κ, z, r¯) the output of the environment in the ideal interaction between
the simulator S and the ideal functionality F under security parameter κ, input z and randomness r¯ =
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(rZ , rS , rF ), where (z, rZ), rS and rF are respectively related to Z, S and F . The real world execution and
the ideal executions are respectively represented by the ensembles REALpi,A,Z = {REALpi,A,Z(κ, z, r¯)}κ∈N and
IDEALF,S,Z = {IDEALF,S,Z(κ, z, r¯)}κ∈N with z ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a uniformly chosen r¯.
In addition to these two models of computation, the UC framework also considers the G-hybrid world,
where the computation proceeds as in the real-world with the additional assumption that the parties have
access to an auxiliary ideal functionality G. In this model, honest parties do not communicate with the ideal
functionality directly, but instead the adversary delivers all the messages to and from the ideal functionality.
We consider the communication channels to be ideally authenticated, so that the adversary may read but
not modify these messages. Unlike messages exchanged between parties, which can be read by the adversary,
the messages exchanged between parties and the ideal functionality are divided into a public header and a
private header. The public header can be read by the adversary and contains non-sensitive information (such
as session identifiers, type of message, sender and receiver). On the other hand, the private header cannot be
read by the adversary and contains information such as the parties’ private inputs. We denote the ensemble
of environment outputs that represents the execution of a protocol pi in a G-hybrid model as HYBRIDGpi,A,Z
(defined analogously to REALpi,A,Z). UC security is then formally defined as:
Definition 2. A n-party (n ∈ N) protocol pi is said to UC-realize an ideal functionality F in the G-hybrid
model if, for every adversary A, there exists a simulator S such that, for every environment Z, the following
relation holds:
IDEALF,S,Z ≈ HYBRIDGpi,A,Z .
We say that the protocol is statistically secure if the same holds for all Z with unbounded computing power.
Appendix B Interactive Proximity Testing
To prove Theorem 2 we rely on the Theorem 6 from [26,19] and the following Lemma 1.
Theorem 6 ([26,19]). Fix a finite field F of constant size. For all integers n,m with m ≤ n there exists
a family of linear universal hash functions G : Fn → Fm such that each function G ∈ G can be described by
O(n) bits and computed in time O(n).
Lemma 1. Let d = d(s) be a positive integer. Let F be a finite field of constant size and F′ be an extension
field of F of degree l = ds+ log|F|(d)e. Let n = n(s, d) be such that a multiplication in F′ can be performed in
time O(n). Let G : Fn → Fl be a family of F-linear universal hash functions which can be computed in time
O(n) and has seed length O(n). Let φ : Fl → F′ be a linear embedding of Fl into F′. For a function G ∈ G
and an element α ∈ F′, define the function HG,α : Fl+d·n → F′ ∼= Fs+log|F|(d) by





where x = (x0,x1, . . . ,xd−1) ∈ Fl × (Fn)d. Define the family H by H = {HG,α : G ∈ G, α ∈ F′}. Then
the family H is 2−s-almost universal, has sub-linear seed-length O(n) and can be computed in linear time
O(d · n). Moreover, if x0 is uniformly random, then HG,α(x) is uniformly random for any (x1, . . . ,xd−1)
(fixed or independent of x0).
Instantiating the family G in Lemma 1 with the family provided in Theorem 6 we obtain Theorem 2.
Remark 2. We can choose the function n(s, d) as small as O((s + log|F|(d)) · polylog(s + log|F|(d))), if a fast
multiplication algorithm for F′ is used.
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Proof. The uniformity property follows immediately. We will show that H is 2−s almost universal. Let
x = (x0, . . . ,xd−1) 6= 0. Thus there exists an i ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1} such that xi 6= 0. If i = 0 then φ(x0) 6= 0
as φ is injective. If i > 0 then it holds for a randomly chosen G
$←G that G(xi) 6= 0, except with prob-
ability 1/|F|l = 1/|F′|. Consequently by injectivity of φ it holds that φ(G(xi)) 6= 0. Suppose now that
0 6= (φ(x0), φ(G(x1)) . . . , φ(G(xd−1))) ∈ F′d. Then





is a non-zero polynomial of degree at most d− 1, and consequently P (X) has at most d− 1 zeros. It follows
that for a random α
$←F′ that




i = P (α) 6= 0,
except with probability (d− 1)/|F′|. All together, we can conclude that HG,α(x) 6= 0, except with probability
1/|F′|+ (d− 1)/|F′| = d/|F|l = |F|−s
over the choice of G
$←G and α $←F′, as |F′| = |F|s+log|F|(d).
Notice that the seed size of HG,α is
|G|+ log(|F′|) = O(n) + (s+ log|F|(d)) log(|F|) = O(n).
We will finally show that for any choice of G ∈ G and α ∈ F′ the function HG,α can be computed in linear
time in the size of its input x. Computing G(x1), . . . , G(xd) takes time O(d · n), as computing each G(xi)
takes time O(n). By choosing the representation of the field F′ appropriately computing the embedding φ is
esssentially free. Next, evaluating the polynomial P (X) = φ(x0) +
∑d−1
i=1 φ(G(xi))X
i at α naively costs d− 1
additions and 2(d − 1) multiplications. Since both additions and multiplications in F′ can be performed in
time O(n), the overall cost of evaluating P (X) at α can be bounded by O(l + d · n). All together, we can
compute HG,α in time O(l + d · n), which is linear in the size of the input.
Theorem 7 (Theorem 6 in [16]). Fix a finite field F of constant size. There exists a constant γ > 0
and an explicit family of F-linear codes (Cs)s of length O(s2), minimum distance s and rate 1− s−γ , which
approaches 1. Moreover, C has an encoding algorithm Enc that runs in time O(s2), which is linear in the
codeword length.
Appendix C Committing to Arbitrary Messages with ΠAHCOM
Protocol ΠAHCOM described in Section 3 realizes FAHCOM, which only allows for commitments to random
messages. While committing to random messages can be useful for a number of applications (e.g. [23]), in
many scenarios it is necessary to commit to arbitrary messages. It has been shown in [16] that FAHCOM can
be used to build a protocol for additively homomorphic commitments to arbitrary messages that also achieves
rate-1 and linear time (given that ΠAHCOM is used to instantiate FAHCOM). The basic idea consists in having
the sender provide the receiver with the difference between the arbitrary message it wants to commit to
and one of the random messages provided by FAHCOM, essentially using them as one-time pads. In order
to commit to an arbitrary message m′, P executes the commitment phase of FAHCOM to obtain a random
message m, then it computes c = m′−m and broadcasts c. In order to add two commitments, P issues the
addition command to FAHCOM and sets c3 = c1 + c2 = m′1 +m′2−m1−m2. In the opening phase, P issues
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Protocol ΠARBHCOM
Protocol ΠARBHCOM is run by a sender P with inputs m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
m ∈ {0, 1}k and set of receivers V = {V1, . . . , Vt},
who interact with FCOM and proceed as follows:
1. Commitment Phase:
(a) On input (commit, sid, ssid,m′j), P sends (commit, sid, ssid, P, V ) to FAHCOM. Upon receiving
(commit, sid, ssid, P, V,mj) as answer, P sets cj = m
′
j −mj , and sends (cj, sid, ssid,) to V .
2. Addition:
(a) On input (add, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3), P sends (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3, P, V ) to FAHCOM and sets c3 =










(a) On input (reveal, ssid1, . . . , ssido) P sends (reveal, ssid1, . . . , ssido) to FAHCOM and halts.
(b) Upon receiving (reveal, sid, ssid, P, V,m1, . . . ,mo) from FAHCOM, for j ∈ {1, . . . , o} V computes m′j =
cj+mj and outputs m
′
j . Note that, even if c is an addition of two commitments c1 and c2, this procedure





Fig. 11. Protocol ΠARBHCOM: Using ΠAHCOM to commit to arbitrary messages.
the opening command to FAHCOM, allowing V to obtain the intended message by computing m′ = c+m. We
give the description of Protocol ΠARBHCOM in almost verbatim form [16] in Figure 11. The only difference
is that Protocol ΠARBHCOM only allows for a single batch opening.
As stated in [16], the security of ΠARBHCOM can be trivially observed since the random string from
FAHCOM acts as a one-time pad hiding all information and binding is guaranteed by FAHCOM. Hence,
ΠARBHCOM is statistically secure in the FAHCOM-hybrid model (which is realized by ΠHCOM). Notice that
ΠARBHCOM instantiated with ΠAHCOM also achieves rate-1, since the commitment phase of ΠAHCOM only
sends the n − k bottom rows of W and T0,T1, which only depend on the security parameter and are
amortized over many commitments. When ΠARBHCOM is instantiated using ΠAHCOM to realize FAHCOM,
the extra communication in relation to ΠAHCOM corresponds to the remaining k bits that define each m
′
j .
Moreover, it is possible to embed the difference c in W so that no extra rounds are required. Hence, in this
case, ΠARBHCOM is rate-1 and linear time.
Appendix D Security Proofs for ΠAHCOM
Lemma 2 (Security Against a Corrupt P ). There exists a simulator SP such that for every static
adversary A who corrupts P and all but one receivers in V = {V1, . . . , Vt}, and any environment Z, the
environment cannot distinguish ΠAHCOM composed with FCOM and A from SP composed with FAHCOM.
That is, we have
IDEALFAHCOM,SP ,Z ≈c HYBRIDFCOMΠAHCOM,A,Z .
Proof. In case the adversary Pˆ corrupts the sender P and all but one receivers in V , the simulator SP has
to run an internal copy of ΠAHCOM with Pˆ , extract the messages in commitments performed by A and send
them to FAHCOM. We describe the simulator SP in Figure 12. The simulator SP will run protocol ΠAHCOM
with an internal copy of Pˆ exactly as an honest V would.
Notice that SP emulates the instances of FCOM used by A following the exact instructions of FCOM
but learning r and the seeds si,j . Using this knowledge, SP reconstructs matrices ∆,Q,B following the
instructions of an honest V in the opening phase. With the reconstructed ∆,Q,B and matrices H,T0,T1
learned in the course of the execution with Pˆ , SP has exactly the same view as an honest V will have in the
opening phase (when it learns r and si,r[1] for i = 1, . . . , n from FCOM). Hence, if the checks of an honest V
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Simulator SP
Simulator SP interacts with environment Z, functionality FAHCOM and an internal copy of the adversary Pˆ .
Upon being activated by Z, SV proceeds as follows:
1. Emulating FCOM: SP executes exactly the steps of FCOM. SP stores the vector r = r1⊕ . . .⊕ rt computed
using the vectors ri received from the receivers Vi (including itself and the receivers controlled by Pˆ ).
Moreover, it stores the seeds si,j received from Pˆ for i ∈ [n] and j ∈ {0, 1}.
2. Commitment Phase: SP executes the steps of the commitment phase of ΠAHCOM exactly like an honest
V would do. After completing the commitment phase with Pˆ , SP learns W,T0,T1 from Pˆ and H from r′
(which in turn is obtained from FCOM during the execution). SP uses its knowledge of si,j to reconstruct
R0,R1,R and then obtain A given W. Next, SP uses W and its knowledge of the seeds si,j and r to
reconstruct ∆, Q and B as honest receivers would in Step 4(a) of the opening phase. SP executes the tests of
an honest verifier in Step 4(b) using H,T0,T1 obtained in the execution with Pˆ and ∆,Q,B reconstructed
previously. If the checks succeed, for j ∈ [m], SP decodes column A[·, j] obtaining message mj . Otherwise, it
samples mj ← {0, 1}k. Finally, SP sends (commit, sid, ssidj , P, V,mj) to FAHCOM. We will show that if the
checks of an honest verifier’s steps in ΠAHCOM fail, then SP will abort in the Opening Phase (as an honest
verifier would). Otherwise, the remaining m columns of A can indeed be decoded to their corresponding
committed messages except with negligible probability.
3. Addition: Upon receiving (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2) from Pˆ , SP execute the steps of ΠAHCOM for addition,
chooses an unused ssid ssid3 and sends (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3, P, V ) to FAHCOM.
4. Opening Phase: Upon receiving (sid, ssid1, . . . , ssido, (A0[·, j],A1[·, j])j∈J) from Pˆ , SP executes the exact
steps of an honest V inΠAHCOM. If any of the checks fails (meaning one of the (A0[·, j],A1[·, j]) is not a consis-
tent opening),, SP outputs whatever Pˆ outputs and aborts. Otherwise SP sends (reveal, sid, ssid1, . . . , ssido)
to FAHCOM, outputs whatever Pˆ outputs and halts.
Fig. 12. Simulator SP
performed by SP using this view of H,T0,T1,∆,Q,B fail, it will abort in the opening phase with probability
1 (as an honest V would). In this case, the random messages mj sent by SP to FAHCOM will never be opened,
and the joint distribution of ideal execution with SP is indistinguishable from the real execution with Pˆ .
In case the checks of an honest V performed by SP succeed, it is necessary to extract the messages
contained in A. By using W received from Pˆ in the execution and the seeds si,j received from Pˆ by FCOM
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {0, 1}, SP can reconstruct A by computing R0[i, ·] = PRG(si,0) and R1[i, ·] =
PRG(si,1), for i = 1, . . . , n, and setting A0 = R0, A1 = R1 + W and A = A0 + A1. However, it might be
the case that A 6∈ Cm because Pˆ is malicious. It remains to prove that SP can decode the columns of A
and obtain the committed messages with high probability, even though it might be the case that A 6∈ Cm
(but close enough to Cm). As an intermediate hybrid, we assume that matrices R0,R1 are uniformly
random. Notice that this hybrid is computationally indistinguishable from the actual simulation since the
rows of R0,R1 are generated by stretching uniformly random seeds with PRG, so distinguishing them from
uniformly random matrices of same size breaks the pseudorandomness of PRG. The remainder of this proof
uses the same technique of [16, Lemma 8], which we reproduce in almost verbatim form below:
The simulator will identify < s rows such that A is in Cm except for the identified rows. As the code has
minimum distance s, this allows to erasure decode each column j of A to C and the corresponding decoded
message will be the extracted message mj that the simulator will input to FAHCOM. We now give the details.
Let R ⊂ [n] be a set of indices specifying rows of A. For a column vector c ∈ Fn we let piR(c) = (c[i])i∈[n]\R
be the vector punctured at the indices i ∈ R. For a matrix M we let MR = piR(M) be the matrix with each
column punctured using piR and for a set S we let SR = {piR(s)|s ∈ S}. The simulator will need to find
R ⊂ [n] with |R| < s such that
AR ∈ CmR . (2)
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It should furthermore hold that
H∞((bi)i∈R|Pˆ ) = 0 (3)
H∞((bi)i∈[n]\R|Pˆ ) = n− |R| , (4)
where Pˆ here denotes the view of Pˆ in the simulator so far, i.e., the adversary can guess R and each choice
bit bi for i ∈ R with certainty at this point in the simulation and has no extra information on bi for i 6∈ R.
Define T := AH. Let Tˆ0 and Tˆ1 be the values sent by P and let Tˆ = Tˆ0 + Tˆ1. Let T0 = R0H and
T1 = (R1 + W)H be the values that Pˆ should have sent. Let T = T0 + T1. Let R be the smallest set such
that TˆR = TR. We claim that this set fulfills (2), (3) and (4).
We know that the receiver did not abort, which implies that ∆Tˆ1 + (I −∆)Tˆ0 = BH. The i’th row of
∆Tˆ1 + (I−∆)Tˆ0 can be seen to be Tˆbi [i, ·]. The i’th row of B can be seen to be biW[i, ·] + Rbi , so the i’th
row of BH is Tbi [i, ·]. We thus have for all i that
Tˆbi [i, ·] = Tbi [i, ·] .
For each i ∈ R we have that Tˆ[i, ·] 6= T[i, ·], so we must therefore have for all i ∈ R that
Tˆ1−bi [i, ·] 6= T1−bi [i, ·] .
It follows that if V for position i had chosen the choice bit 1 − bi instead of bi, then the protocol would
have aborted. Since Pˆ can compute the correct values Tbi [i, ·] and T1−bi [i, ·] it also knows which value of bi
will make the test pass. By assumption the protocol did not abort. This proves (3). It also proves that the
probability of the protocol not aborting and R having size |R| is at most 2−|R| as Pˆ has no information on
b1, . . . , bn prior to sending Tˆ0 and Tˆ1 so Pˆ can guess (bi)i∈R with probability at most 2−|R|. It is easy to see
that the value of the bits bi for i 6∈ R do not affect whether or not the test succeeds. Therefore these bits are
still uniform in the view of Pˆ at this point.
In particular, we can therefore continue under the assumption that |R| < s. We can then apply Theorem
1 where we set X = A. From |R| < s it follows that XH has distance less than s to Cm, so we must be
in case 2 in Theorem 1. Now, since the receiver checks that Tˆ ∈ Cl and the protocol did not abort, we in
particular have that TˆR ∈ ClR from which it follows that TR ∈ ClR , which in turn implies that ARH ∈ ClR
and thus XRH ∈ ClR . We can therefore pick a codeword C′ ∈ Cl such that the row support of XH−C′ is
R. From Theorem 1 we then get that there exists C ∈ Cm such that the row support of A−C is R. From
this it follows that AR = CR, which implies (2).
Now notice that since C has minimum distance s and |R| < s the punctured code CR will have minimum
distance at least 1. Therefore the simulator can from each column A[i, ·]R ∈ CR decode the corresponding
message mj ∈ {0, 1}k. This is the message that the simulator will input to FAHCOM on behalf of Pˆ .
In order to fool SP and open a commitment to a different message than the one that has been extracted
from A[·, j], Pˆ would have to provide A′0[·, j],A′1[·, j] such that A′[·, j] = A′0[·, j]+A′1[·, j] is a valid codeword
of C corresponding to a different message m′. However, notice that since CR has minimum distance s− |R|,
that would require Pˆ to modify an additional s − |R| positions of A that are not contained in R so that it
does not get caught in the checks performed by a honest V in the opening phase. That means that Pˆ would
have to guess s− |R| of the choice bits bi for i 6∈ R. It follows from (4) that this will succeed with probability
at most 2|R|−s. Taken in combination with the fact that Pˆ suceeded in passing the previous checks without
the protocol aborting with probability 2−|R|, the total probability of success for Pˆ is 2−|R| · 2|R|−s = 2−s.
Lemma 3 (Security Against a Corrupt V ). There exists a simulator SV such that for every static
adversary A who corrupts all receivers in V = {V1, . . . , Vt}, and any environment Z, the environment cannot
distinguish ΠAHCOM composed with FCOM and A from SV composed with FAHCOM. That is, we have
IDEALFAHCOM,SV ,Z ≈c HYBRIDFCOMΠAHCOM,A,Z .
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Simulator SV
Simulator SV interacts with environment Z , functionality FAHCOM and an internal copy of adversary Vˆ . Upon
being activated by Z, SV proceeds as follows:
1. Emulating FCOM: SV executes exactly the steps of FCOM, storing r = r1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ rt computed using the
random strings ri received from Vi for i ∈ [t] (controlled by Vˆ ).
2. Commitment Phase: Upon receiving (receipt, sid, ssid1, . . . , ssidm, P, V ) from FAHCOM, SV runs the steps
of an honest P in the commitment phase exactly as in ΠAHCOM.
3. Addition: Upon receiving (add, sid, ssid1, ssid2, ssid3, P, V, success) from FAHCOM, SV runs the steps of an
honest P exactly as in ΠAHCOM (using indexes i and j associated to ssid1, ssid2).
4. Opening Phase: Let J = {j1, . . . , jo} be the set of indexes associated with ssid of the opening phase,
ssid1, . . . , ssido. Upon receiving (reveal, sid, ssid, P, V,mj) from FAHCOM for j ∈ J , SV uses its knowledge of
r[1], . . . , r[n] to compute alternative columns A0
′[·, j],A1′[·, j] such that A′[·, j] = A0′[·, j]+A1′[·, j] is a valid
commitment to mj that can opened without being caught by Vˆ even though mj is different from the messages
committed to in the commitment phase. Namely, SV initially sets A0′[·, j] = A0[·, j],A1′[·, j] = A1[·, j] and
then sets A′1−r[i][·, j] = C(mj) − Ar[i][·, j]. Note that matrices A0′[·, j],A1′[·, j] only differ from matrices
A0[·, j],A1[·, j] obtained in the commitment phase in positions that are not known by Vˆ . Finally, SV sends
(sid, ssid1, . . . , ssido, (A0
′[·, j],A1′[·, j])j∈J) to Vˆ , outputs whatever Vˆ outputs and halts.
Fig. 13. Simulator SV
Proof. In case the adversary corrupts all receivers in V , the simulator SV has to run ΠAHCOM with an internal
copy of Vˆ , commit to a random string and then equivocate this commitment (i.e., open it to an arbitrary
message) when it receives the actual message from FAHCOM. In order to achieve this, we construct a SV that
executes the commitment phase exactly as an honest P in ΠAHCOM, only deviating in the opening phase.
We describe SV in Figure 13.
Again we use an intermediate hybrid, where we assume that matrices R0,R1 are uniformly random. Notice
that this hybrid is computationally indistinguishable from the actual simulation since the rows of R0,R1 are
generated by stretching uniformly random seeds with PRG, so distinguishing them from uniformly random
matrices of same size breaks the pseudorandomness of PRG.
Notice that Vˆ has no information at all about the committed strings after the commitment phase. This
is true because each row of B is one additive share of A (either a row from R0 or a row from R1 adjusted
by W) that trivially contains no information. Moreover, matrix P is never revealed and Q has the same
structure as B (containing no information about P). Hence, matrices T0,T1 seen by Vˆ in the commitment
phase contain no information about the message encoded in A.
Notice that SV learns vector r by observing vectors ri sent to FCOM by Vˆ and that the inverses of
bits r[1], . . . , r[n] represent the positions of the matrices that are unknown to Vˆ (i.e., unknown to V in the
real world). In this scenario, SV can open a commitment to an arbitrary message without being detected.
Note that SV executes the exact steps of an honest P in ΠAHCOM except for the opening phase. For each
commitment associated with index j to be opened, SV sends A0′[·, j],A1′[·, j], which are different from the
vector A0[·, j],A1[·, j] computed in the commitment phase and that would be sent in a real execution of
ΠAHCOM. However, A0
′[·, j],A1′[·, j], only differ from A0[·, j],A1[·, j] in positions that are unknown by Vˆ .
Hence, the joint distribution of the ideal execution with simulator SV is computationally indistinguishable
from the real execution of ΠAHCOM with corrupted receivers.
Appendix E Security Proofs for ΠMHCOM
Theorem 4. Protocol ΠMHCOM UC realizes FMHCOM in the FCOM-hybrid model with computational security
against a static adversary. Formally, there exists a simulator S such that for every static adversary A, and any
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environment Z, the environment cannot distinguish ΠMHCOM composed with FCOM and A from S composed
with FMHCOM. That is, we have
IDEALFMHCOM,S,Z ≈c HYBRIDFCOMΠMHCOM,A,Z .
Proof. If the adversary Pˆ corrupts the sender P and all but one receivers in V , the simulator SP will
analogously as in the proof of Lemma 2 learn the seeds si,j , ŝi,j , r, ∆, ∆
′, B, B′, B̂, Q, Q′, Q̂, H, T˜0, T˜1,
T˜2. Then it will do all checks that the honest verifier will do in the step 4(b). If the checks fail, it will abort





and we need to
prove that SP can extract the committed messages with high probability even in the case where A˜ /∈ (C˜)m.
In order to do that, the simulator SP will find sets of rows R, Rˆ of rows (where R is a subset of the rows in
A and Rˆ is a subset of the rows in Â) such that R, Rˆ are small and such that A˜ would be in (C˜)m except
for those rows (i.e. there exists C˜ ∈ (C˜)m which equals A˜ in the remaining rows).
For j = 0, 1, 2, let Uj , Uˆj , be matrices sent by the corrupt prover in place of the values Tj , Tˆj that
it should have sent. Let U = U0 + U1 + U2 and define Uˆ, T, Tˆ analogously. The simulator defines R
(respectively Rˆ) to be the set of rows in which T and U (respectively Tˆ and Uˆ) differ.
Now call ri = r[i] the selections of the verifier. Since the receiver did not abort, then Uri = Tri ,
Uri+1 = Tri+1, Uˆri = Tˆri For every position in R, it must hold that Uri+2 6= Tri+2, while for every position
in Rˆ, either Uˆri+1 6= Tˆri+1 or Uˆri+2 6= Tˆri+2 (or both). The probability that the protocol does not abort
equals the probability that Pˆ guesses ri exactly for every i in R and guesses a subset of two (out of three)
elements in which ri is, for every i in Rˆ \ R. Therefore the probability that the protocol does not abort is
(1/3)|R|(2/3)|Rˆ\R|. We can assume R ⊆ Rˆ (indeed this is in Pˆ ’s advantage: if Pˆ changes a share for the
i-th row of T successfully, then it is because it guessed ri exactly, but then it can change the i-th row Tˆ
“for free”). Nevertheless, the maximum number of total coordinates that Pˆ can change (the maximum of
|R|+ |Rˆ|) such that the probability that the protocol does not abort is at least 2−s is achieved for R = ∅ and
|Rˆ| = βs where β = 1/(log2 3 − 1). Therefore assume that Pˆ can change at most βs coordinates, and recall
that by assumption βs < dist(C∗2) ≤ dist(C˜). We are then in case 2 of Theorem 1 when applied to X = Aˆ





∈ (C˜)m with CR = AR and ĈRˆ = ÂRˆ
(where the notation AR means the submatrix of A consisting of all rows except those indexed by R). Hence
A˜ belongs to (C˜)m except for the rows in R and Rˆ. Since these are in total less than dist(C˜) coordinates,
the simulator can now erasure-correct each column and input that as messages to FMHCOM.
In order to open a commitment to a different message and avoid that the verifier aborts, Pˆ would need to
modify additional positions Q and Qˆ, respectively in the matrices A and Aˆ where Q is disjoint with R and
Qˆ is disjoint with Qˆ so that in total |R|+ |Q|+ |Rˆ|+ |Qˆ| ≥ dist(C˜) = βs since Pˆ needs to reveal a codeword
in C˜. Pˆ can guess correctly the selections of the choices of the verifier in the new sets with probability
(1/3)|Q|(2/3)|Qˆ\Q|. Under these conditions, and similarly to what is mentioned above the probability that
the protocol does not abort either because of the choices of the R’s or of the Q’s is at most 2−s.
Finally we need to prove that, given two committed values (indexed by i, j), Pˆ cannot fool SP by creating
a third commitment that it claims to contain the product of the two committed values, but which it can open
to a different message.
Let wl, l = 0, 1, 2, be the vectors created from the matrices Al and Aˆl as in the Protocol ΠMHCOM.
Remember that Pˆ may have cheated in positions R, Rˆ of the matrices A and Aˆ respectively and that we
were assuming that R ⊆ Rˆ (since this is in Pˆ ’s advantage). Let w = w0 +w1 +w2. Note that wRˆ ∈ C∗2Rˆ .
Pˆ can now choose to announce some arbitrary vectors w′l. However, if w′ri [i] 6= wri [i], then the protocol
will abort. This is because the verifier can compute wri [i] from Ari , Ari+1 , Aˆri . Let M the set of positions
outside Rˆ where w 6= w′. The verifier will abort if w′ /∈ C∗2. Since wRˆ ∈ C∗2Rˆ, if the verifier does not abort
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either |Rˆ ∪M | = 0 (i.e. Pˆ has not cheated) or |Rˆ ∪M | ≥ dist(C∗2) > βs. So the protocol has not aborted
at this point if Pˆ has been able to guess, for every i ∈ Rˆ ∪M , a pair of indices {a, b} ⊆ {0, 1, 2} such that
ri ∈ {a, b} and |Rˆ ∪M | ≥ dist(C∗2). This occurs with probability smaller than (2/3)βs = 2−s.
In case the adversary Vˆ corrupts all receivers in V , the simulator SV first runs the commit phase and the
computation steps of ΠMHCOM as an honest P and then equivocates these commitments when it receives the
actual messages from FMHCOM. This is possible for two reasons, first Vˆ has no information at all about the
committed messages before the opening phase. This is true because: 1) the matrices W and Ŵ broadcasted
during the commit phase (if adjusted by R2 and R̂2, respectively) represent one out of three additive shares
of the components of the codewords encoding the committed messages and therefore they trivially contains
no information, 2) the matrix P˜ and the columns of A˜ used in the multiplication steps are never revealed;
hence the matrices T˜i for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} from the commit phase and the triples from the multiplication step
(i.e. one triple (w0,w1,w2) for each multiplication) contains no information (i.e., they are additive share of
values that don’t contain information).
Second, Vˆ learns the vector r by emulating FCOM and therefore it knows the index of the shares that
are checked by Vˆ in the opening phase. This implies that in order to equivocate a commitment, SV simply
needs to modify the share not checked by Vˆ before broadcasting them at the beginning of the opening
phase. In more detail, for any j ∈ {ssid1, . . . , ssido} upon receiving mj from FMHCOM as opening of the
commitment associated with the index j, SV defines A′r[i]+2[·, j] = C(mj) − Ar[i]+1[·, j] − Ar[i][·, j] and
A′r[i]+l[·, j] = Ar[i]+l[·, j] for l ∈ {0, 1} (where Ai[·, j] are the ones constructed for the commit phases
executed by Vˆ ). Now, Vˆ broadcasts (sid, ssid,A′0[·, j],A′1[·, j],A′2[·, j]) and outputs the same value as Vˆ .
This guarantees that the joint distribution of the ideal execution with simulator SV is computationally
indistinguishable from the real execution of ΠAHCOM with receivers controlled by Vˆ .
Appendix F Publicly Verifiable Multi-Receiver Additively Homomorphic
Commitments
The functionality for publicly verifiable additively homomorphic commitments FPVHCOM used in the Insured
MPC protocol of Baum et al. [4] is described in Figure 14.
Functionality FPVHCOM
FPVHCOM interacts with a sender P , a set of receivers V = {V1, . . . , Vm}, a set of external verifiers U , and an
adversary S and proceeds as follows:
– Commit Phase: As in FAHCOM.
– Addition: As in FAHCOM.
– Open Phase: As in FAHCOM.
– Public Verification: Upon receiving a message (verify, sid, ssid, P, V,m) from Ui ∈ U , if a tuple
(ssid, P, V,m) was previously recorded and revealed, then send (verified, sid, ssid, P, V,m) to Ui.
– Register External Verifier: Upon receiving (register) from Ui, set U = U ∪ Ui and return (registered) to
Ui.
– Deregister External Verifier: Upon receiving (deregister) from Ui, set U = U \Ui and return (deregistered)
to Ui.
– Check Registration: Upon receiving (is− registered) from Ui, return (is− registered, b) to Ui, where b = 1
if Ui ∈ U and b = 0 otherwise.
– Get Registred: Upon receiving (get− registered) from the ideal adversary S, the functionality returns
(get− registered, U) to S.
Fig. 14. Functionality FPVHCOM
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Appendix G Applications to Efficient Zero-Knowledge Arguments
In this section, we show how to use a variant of the homomorphic commitments constructed in Section
3 and 4 to compile a certain class of public coin interactive proof system into public coin honest-verifier
zero-knowledge proof systems. Using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, we can convert such a zero-knowledge proof
system into a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system. As an application, we can improve a recent
construction of zkSNARKs [32] in a certain parameter regime. Specifically, the zkSNARK construction of [32]
uses additively homomorphic vector commitments15 to transform a public coin interactive proof system into a
zero-knowledge protocol. The commitments in [32] are instantiated using number-theoretic assumptions. The
construction of [32] is general enough that it can be instantiated with homomorphic commitment schemes
with some additional properties. We remark though that [32] utilizes an additional optimization which relies
on compressing homomorphic commitments, which is not available in our setting.
Our main observation is that for this application the unveil of the commitments in the protocol of [32] can
be delayed until the very end of the protocol, which makes this protocol compatible with our commitment
scheme.
The notion of interactive proof system we focus on will be resettably sound public coin interactive proofs
with algebraic verifier. Such a proof system proceeds in t rounds, where in each round i the prover sends a
message pi, upon which the verifier answers with a uniformly random message vi. We require all the messages
pi and vi to be vectors over a field F. After the conversation is over, the verifier evaluates a system of low
degree polynomials F1, . . . , Fs in the pi and vi and accepts if all Fi evaluate to 0, otherwise it rejects. At the
heart of this kind of protocol is the sum-check protocol, which lets a prover prove statements of the form∑
x∈{0,1}n P (x) = L, where P ∈ F[X1, . . . , Xn] is a low-degree polynomial and L ∈ F.
While it can be shown that any constant round proof system can be immediately compiled into a non-
interactive argument system via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [20], super-constant round protocols need to fulfil
a stronger soundness property called resettable soundness for the Fiat-Shamir transform to result in a sound
protocol.
We will now outline how to compile any resettable sound public coin interactive proof system into an
honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof systems in a way that only slightly increases the communication com-
plexity and only affects the efficiency of prover and verifier by a small constant factor.
The basic idea of the transformation is simple and follows the paradigm of committed conversations [5]. The
prover and verifier run the interactive proof system with the modification that instead of sending its messages
in the plain, the prover sends commitments to its messages. After the protocol is over the prover convinces the
verifier that the commitment values pass the verification equations F1, . . . , Fs. The homomorphic property of
the commitments will be used to implement this check efficiently. While our protocol ΠMHCOM does support
evaluation of low degree polynomials, we will focus on linear/affine verification equations F1, . . . , Fs and will
therefore rely on the additively homomorphic commitment scheme ΠAHCOM.
Let (P,V) be a t-round public coins interactive proof system for a language L with verification equations
F1, . . . , Fs such that the equations Fi(x, p1, . . . , pt, v1, . . . , vt) are affine in (p1, . . . , pt). In our construction,
we will use protocol ΠAHCOM with several modifications.
– We will only consider a single verifier V
– While the scheme ΠAHCOM in section 3 supports to committing to vectors over Fλ2 and supports additions
(i.e. F2-linear operations), we can modify the scheme such that we can commit to vectors over Fλ for
a large finite field F while supporting F-linear operations. The resulting scheme does not have linear
complexity but still achieves quasi-linear complexity and rate 1.
– Moreover, the commitment scheme ΠAHCOM in section 3 produces commitments to random vectors. Given
such a commitment to a random vector, we can derandomize the components of the vector sequentially. I.e.
we treat a commitment to a vector of random elements as a vector of commitments to random elements.
15In [32] they are referred to as multi-commitments
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Thus each component of the vector can serve as an individual commitment which can individually be
changed to a commitment of a concrete value.
– In step 1 of the commitment phase of Protocol ΠAHCOM (Figure 4 and Figure 5) the prover P commits
to 2n random seeds si,j for i ∈ [{1, . . . , n}] and j ∈ {0, 1} using a UC-commitment FCOM. This is done
to make the commitment scheme ΠAHCOM extractable. For the context of the current application, it is
sufficient to downgrade this to a non-interactive commitment scheme Commit which is perfectly binding
and computationally hiding. Such a commitment scheme can be constructed e.g. from an injective one-way
function.
– In step 2 of the commitment phase of ΠAHCOM the verifier commits to a challenge r
′ using a UC-
commitment FCOM. This step in necessary to make the commitment scheme ΠAHCOM equivocal. In the
context of the current application, we only need to achieve honest-verifier ZK in order to apply the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic. Consequently, we can drop this commitment step and have the verifier send r′ in the
clear after the end of the commitment phase.
The protocol ΠHV ZK is provided in Figure 15. We can also instantiate ΠHV ZK with the commitment protocol
ΠMHCOM (Section 4) and allow the verification equations F1, . . . , Fk to be low degree polynomials in the pi
rather than just linear, which however comes at the expense of a worse rate (i.e. constant rate instead of rate
1).
Protocol ΠHV ZK
1. Prover P : On input a statement x and a witness w, let m be a polynomial upper bound on the number of
field elements in F that P sends in the interaction with V upon input (x,w). P runs the setup step of the
commitment protocol ΠAHCOM to pre-compute for m F-vector commitments of length n. We assume that
component-commitments are used in such that verification equations waste a minimal number of commit-
ments.
2. Prover P and Verifier V run the following interaction for i = 1, . . . , t:
– P computes pi ← P(x,w, i, v1, . . . , vi−1) and computes a commitment pˆi on pi using the modified
ΠAHCOM.
– Upon receiving pˆi, the verifier V chooses a uniformly random value vi and sends it to P .
3. P now provides a proof to V that the verification equations Fi(x, pˆ1, . . . , pˆt, v1, . . . , vt) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , s
hold using the additively homomorphic property of ΠAHCOM.
4. P and V now run the consistency check/opening phase of ΠAHCOM. As described above, for this consistency
check V uses fresh random coins. If the consistency check passes, V outputs 1, otherwise 0.
Fig. 15. Protocol ΠHV ZK
Completeness of the protocol ΠHV ZK follows immediately from the completeness of (P,V). We will briefly
argue why the protocol is sound and honest-verifier zero-knowledge. First, we will sketch how we can establish
soundness of ΠHV ZK given that (P,V) is sound. First notice that the commitment scheme ΠAHCOM is statisti-
cally binding, as the underlying commitment scheme Commit is also statistically binding. Therefore, the prover
messages (pˆ1, . . . , pˆt) commit uniquely to messages (p1, . . . , pt). Moreover, the proofs for homomorphic rela-
tions are also statistically sound. Thus, if the verifier accepts, it must hold that Fi(x, p1, . . . , pt, v1, . . . , vt) = 0
for i = 1, . . . , s. But by the soundness of (P,V) this means that x is in the language L, except with negligible
probability over the random coins of V.
Notice further that if (P,V) is resettably sound, then so is ΠHV ZK , as the opening phase of ΠAHCOM has
only a negligible soundness error.
To see why the protocol is honest-verifier zero-knowledge, notice that the commitment scheme ΠAHCOM
becomes equivocal if the prover knows the challenge r′ of the verifier before the start of the protocol, see
the construction of simulator SV in Figure 13 in Appendix D. The simulator for ΠHV ZK can choose r′ and
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setup ΠAHCOM to be equivocal. In the simulated proof it sets the pˆi fake commitments. During the opening
phase, it opens the commitments to fake values (just as SV ).
Instantiation We will now discuss instantiating the hyrax protocol of [32] with the modified version of the
commitment scheme ΠAHCOM.
To prove satisfiability of an algebraic circuit of depth d, width G and input/witness size |w|, the hyrax
protocol has proof size (10d log(G) +
√|w|) · κ assuming that a group element in a DLOG-hard group G has
size κ. The verifier runtime is O(
√|w| + d · log(G)) whereas the prover runtime is linear in the size of the
circuit C.
Replacing the DLOG-based homomorphic commitment in the hyrax protocol with our commitment pro-
tocol ΠAHCOM as outlined above, the main optimization which is not available is compression of the witness
w. Consequently, in our instantiation proof size will depend linearly on the size of the witness |w|.
One of the key ideas in the hyrax protocol is to reduce all algebraic relations between commitments to
linear relations between vector commitments. In this way, general algebraic relations can be proven using a
protocol which just supports linear relations between vectors. This transformation only incurs a small constant
factor additional overhead. Omitting details, there are three main steps. In the first step reduce multiplicative
relations to linear relations, in the second step show that many linear relations can be compressed into a single
linear relation, and in. the third step step reduce linear relations between commitments to linear relations
between vector commitments. All three steps are implemented using a Schnorr-style protocol. In [32] these
transformations are provided for the concrete case of DLOG-based commitments, but these ideas can be
implemented using arbitrary homomorphic vector commitments. We will briefly outline the main ideas.
From quadratic relations to linear relations Assume that given 3 commitments c1 = com(x), c2 = com(y)
and c3 = com(x · y) the prover wants to convince the verifier that c3 commits to the product of the values
committed to in c1 and c2. This can be achieved via the following protocol. First the prover computes 2
new commitments c′2 = com(r) and c
′
3 = com(r · x) and sends the commitments to the verifier. The verifier
responds with a uniformly random field element γ
$←F. In the last step, the prover send a value z = r+γ ·y to
the verifier and proves the following 2 relations using the homomorphic property of the commitment scheme.
1. c′2 + γ · c2 opens to z
2. c′3 + γ · c3 − z · c1 opens to 0
Correctness of the protocol follows routinely and and honest-verifier ZK can be established using equivocality
of the commitments. To see that the protocol is sound, assume that c3 commits to a value different from x ·y,
say x · y + t for a t 6= 0 and that c′3 contains a value r′. Note that the first check enforces that z = r + γy.
Now the second check passes if and only if
r′ + γ(xy + t)− (r + γy) · x = 0
⇔r′ − r · x+ γt = 0.
Noting that r′, r, x, t were fixed before γ and γ is uniformly random in F, we get that since t 6= 0 it holds
by the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma that this check is passed with probability at most 1/|F|. Consequently the
protocol is sound.
From many linear relations to a single linear relation Assume that for m commitments ci = com(xi) we want
to show that A · x = y, where x = (xi)i and A ∈ Fk×m and y ∈ Fk. Consider the following protocol. The
verifier chooses a random v
$←Fk and sends v to the prover. The prover now uses the linear homomorphic
property of the commitment to prove that
∑m
i=1 wi · com(xi) opens to z, where w = v> ·A and z = v> · y.
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Correctness and honest verifier ZK follow immediately. To show soundness, note that if y = A · x + t for a
t 6= 0, then it holds that
v> ·A · x = v> · (A · x+ t)
⇔v>t = 0
but by the Schwarz-Zippel Lemma this check is passed with probability at most 1/|F|. Consequently the
protocol is sound.
From linear relations to linear relations for vectors We will finally outline how to efficiently prove a linear
relation across all components for a set of vector commitments. Let ci = com(xi) for i = 1, . . . ,m where the
x ∈ Fn are vectors. Now assume the prover wants to convince the verifier that ∑mi=1 a>i xi = y where the
ai ∈ Fn are vectors and y ∈ F.









and sends them to the verifier. The verifier responds with random field element γ
$←F. For every i the
prover now computes zi = ri + γ · xi, sends zi to the verifier and proves the following 3 relations using the
homomorphic property of the commitment scheme.
1. For all i = 1, . . . ,m c′i + γci unveils to zi





i=1 di unveils to y
Again, correctness of the protocol follows routinely and and honest-verifier ZK can be established using
equivocality of the commitments.
To see that the protocol is sound, assume that for some i it holds that di does not commit to a
>
i xi, i.e.
assume that di commits to a
>
i xi + ti, where one of the ti is non-zero. The first check above ensures that
zi = ri + γ · xi. Assume that c′′i commits to a value ui. Now the second check passes if and only if
ui + γ · (a>i xi + ti) = a>i (ri + γ · xi)
⇔γ · ti + ui − a>i ri = 0.
Note again that ti, ui and ri are fixed before γ is chosen and therefore independent of γ. Consequently, if
ti 6= 0 by the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma this check is passed with probability at most 1/|F| and we conclude
that the protocol is sound.
As before these protocols can be made non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir transform. Moreover, both
protocols only need a small constant number of additional commitments. Consequently, when instantiating
the protocol of [32] with our commitment scheme accounting for these modifications we get a scheme with
proof size O((d log(G) + |w|) · |F| + κ), where the additive overhead of κ is due to the setup. The verifier
runtime is O(|w|+ d · log(G)) whereas the prover runtime is still linear in the size of the circuit C.
As mentioned before, the main improvement of our protocol over [32] is that we only rely on simple
private key primitives. On the turn side, our vector-commitments are not compressing, which leads to the
proof-size to depend linearly on the witness-size |w| instead of √|w|. However, the proof size does not depend
multiplicatively on the computational security parameter κ, but rather on |F|, which is a statistical security
parameter an can therefore be chosen much smaller. Consequently, we get an advantage in terms of proof-size
whenever the proof-size is dominated by d rather than |w|.
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